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Mediation of Civil Cases: Neither Panacea
Nor Anathema (A Prescription for
Change in Procedural Rules)
LAWRENCE C. MANNt

I.

INTRODUCTION

The literature on court-annexed mediation and arbitration contains both a large number of claims in support of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) and a number of assertions that those claims are
unfounded.' Few studies have attempted to explain their results in
terms of case management or negotiation theory. An explanation of
the operation of one mediation program, based on the study of several thousand cases, may help to place both the criticisms and alleged benefits of these programs into perspective.
This Article reviews preliminary findings from a study of more
than five thousand civil cases scheduled for mediation in the Third
Judicial Circuit Court of the State of Michigan.' The thesis of this
Article is that mediation and other programs aimed at facilitating
attorney negotiation encourage the prompt and fair disposition of
civil cases. As a subordinate position, I contend that ADR has involved inflated expectations of the putative benefits of mediation
and arbitration programs. Such programs have not and cannot provide a "quick fix" for problems such as delayed civil cases. Under
appropriate circumstances, court-annexed efforts to facilitate negotiation may point toward a new orientation in civil case management
and related procedural rules. In most courts, the rules of civil procedure may not provide a sufficient battery of procedural resources
t

Assistant Professor of Law at Wayne State University Law School, Detroit,

Michigan. The research that provided the basis for this Article was partially funded
by a grant from Wayne State University. The Center for Urban Studies at Wayne
State also participated in the early phases of the research.
The author is indebted to the members of the mediation study team, including
Anne M. Vrooman (a contract employee of the Third Judicial Circuit Court), Terry
Kuykendall (Deputy Administrator for the Third Judicial Circuit Court), and Robert Schweikart (Mediation Clerk). The author would also like to acknowledge the
invaluable assistance of Erna Lynn-Bogue (a graduate student at the University of
Michigan and an SPSSX consultant in the Department of Sociology), and The
Center for Urban Studies, Wayne State University.
1. See Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panaceaor Anathema, 99 HARV. L.
REv. 668 (1986); Pearson, An Evaluation of Alternatives to Court Adjudication, 7 JUST.

Sys.J. 420 (1982).
2. See Mann & Vrooman, Mediation, A Summary of the Findings of the Mediation Study Team (1988) (available from the authors and the ThirdJudicial Circuit
Court in Detroit, Michigan).
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aimed at facilitating attorney negotiations. In the future, procedural
rules must provide increased encouragement and assistance to attorneys in performing what appears to be a primary aspect of their
work-settling cases. This conception of case management and procedural rules somewhat contradicts the dominant view expressed in
the court administration literature and the legislative history of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The civil case management doctrine essentially consists of a series of principles that have resulted from the application of common
senses to specific aspects of court delay.4 These principles are also
reflected in procedural rules that seek to give courts the power to
manage civil litigation. For example, it is argued that early and continuous judicial control over the caseflow process5 and "centralized
administration of a strict continuance policy" 6 will yield a more
prompt resolution of civil actions. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
16 largely embodies this principle.
Although data from relatively recent studies seem to validate
these principles,7 some broader questions remain unanswered. For
example, why does early and continuous judicial control result in
decreased disposition times for some cases? Is "judicial" control
essential, or can some other form of court action be substituted,
3. Judges and attorneys are accustomed to focusing on narrow, piecemeal issues in a two-sided manner. This approach to decision making may not be suited to
administrative policy decisions involving polycentric issues. See H. JACOB, EMPIRICAL THEORIES ABOUT COURTS 204-05 (K.O. Boyum & L. Mather 1983). See also R.
NIMMER, THE NATURE
COURTS 19-26 (1978).

OF SYSTEM

CHANGE: REFORM IMPACT IN THE CRIMINAL

Nimmer provides an excellent discussion of the contemporary, intuitive assumptions that pervade the court reform movement. He focuses
on the criminal courts, but the central assumptions in both the civil and criminal
court reform areas substantially overlap.
4. The mediation program at the core of this study is a case in point. The
Third Judicial Circuit Court has a history of problems associated with delay in civil
litigation, not the least of which was a trial disposition time in excess of four years.
The court has been the subject of several studies. T. CHURCH, A. CARLSON,J. LEE &
T. TAN, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS (Nat'l
Center for State Courts 1978) [hereinafterJUSTiCE DELAYED]; B. MAHONEY, L. SIPES

&J.

ITO, IMPLEMENTING DELAY REDUCTION AND DELAY PREVENTION PROGRAMS IN
URBAN TRIAL COURTS: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM CURRENT RESEARCH (Nat'l
Center for State Courts 1985) [hereinafter IMPLEMENTING DELAY REDUCTION];

Shuart, Smith & Planet, Settling Cases in Detroit:An Examination of Wayne County's "Mediation" Program, 8 JUST. SYS. J. 307 (1983) [hereinafter Settling Cases in Detroit].
5. Caseflow is "the continuum of activities through which cases move within a
court .. " M. SOLOMON, CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT IN THE TRIAL COURT 4 (ABA
Comm. on Standards of Judicial Administration 1973).
6. Friesen, Curesfor Court Congestion: The State of the Art of Court Delay Reduction,
23JUDGEJ. 4 (Winter 1984).
7. See Flanders, Case Management and Court Management in United States District
Courts, District Court Study Series (Federal Judical Center 1977); Connolly & Planet,
Controlling The Caseflow-Kentucky Style: How to Speed up Litigation Without Slowing Down
Justice, 21 JUDGEJ. 8 (Fall 1982).
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with similar effect, for large numbers of cases? Answers to such
questions are clearly beyond this Article. Nevertheless, the expanding body of literature and the Third Judicial Circuit's relative
success with mediation indicate a pathway toward real answers to
the hard questions.
The data generated through the study of the Third Judicial Circuit's mediation program, along with literature from various disciplines, demonstrate that mediation is a valuable processing tool
that, under appropriate conditions, can prompt negotiations behavior and resultant settlements in civil cases. Indeed, court-annexed
mediation may provide an important complement to the "early and
continuous judicial control" concept of civil case management. The
limits of the study design, and therefore the data generated, do not
permit the definitive conclusion that mediation causes more prompt
dispositions in civil cases. There is little doubt, however, that mediation facilitates and stimulates negotiation and case settlement.
The relative success of the Third Judicial Circuit's program,
however, must be placed in context. References to ADR abound in
the literature. Conferences regarding the so called liability insurance crisis, delay reduction in metropolitan courts, and tort reform
all have paid some attention to dispute resolution approaches either
as an alternative to litigation or as an aid in reducing the disposition
times of civil suits. 8 It is claimed that such programs have reduced
backlogs and eliminated delay in civil case resolution. The study of
the Third Judicial Circuit's program, therefore, sought to obtain a
base of information from which inferences could be drawn about the
validity of the various claims made regarding it. Related research
questions involved are: (i) whether mediation has a differential impact on relationship to case type; and (ii) whether mediation has a
greater impact on case settlement than judicially-conducted case
settlement conferences.
Part II of this Article reviews relevant literature and provides a
framework for analysis and explanation. Part III discusses the scope
of the empirical research and the mediation procedures in the Third
Judicial Circuit. Parts IV and V review the data and draw conclusions regarding its implications.
The data and relevant literature demonstrate that mediation/arbitration programs have their most significant impact on the
segment of cases that are destined to settle or otherwise terminate
relatively early. That is, such programs encourage the expedited
8. But see Edwards, supra note 1, at 668. After noting the proliferation of
mechanisms for alternative dispute resolution, Edwards states: "There is reason
for concern, however, that the bandwagon may be on a runaway course. Popularity
and public interest are not sure signs of quality endeavor. This is certainly true of
ADR, because the movement is ill-defined and the motives of some ADR adherents
are questionable." Id.

534

UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:531

settlement or abandonment of cases of which attorneys and litigants
realize are simply not worth the costs and attendant risks associated
with ADR processes. This conclusion does not mean that mediation
does not have or promise significant benefits to the remaining segment of cases. The segment of cases that are actually mediated appear to be profoundly affected by the process. This effect is
measured by: (i) the extent to which cases settle during or shortly
after mediation, but before trial; and (ii) the dollar value involved in
case settlements. Both indices suggest that mediation can facilitate
productive bargaining in civil cases well in advance of judicial involvement in the settlement process.
II.

WHAT WE THINK WE KNOW ABOUT CIVIL LITIGATION:

A

REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE

"Lawsuit, n. a machine which you go into as a pig and come out
as a sausage." 9
Court delay and popular frustration with the legal process are
not new phenomena.'
Nevertheless, our awareness of delay and
the civil litigation process arguably has never been greater. From
the publication of two seminal studies in related areas," understanding of the behavior of civil cases, attorneys, judges, and litigants has increased. 2 Although it is not possible to divide the
literature into discrete categories, for ease of analysis, the literature
discussion is organized on the basis of: (A) case filings and attorney
behavior; (B) adjudicative and administrative behavior; and (C) civil
case processing theory and methodology.
A.

Case Filings and Attorney Behavior

If a "dispute" is any set of circumstances in which the perceived
and articulated interests of the respective participants diverge, 13 the
9. A. BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY 194 (1911). Bierce defines a litigant as
"[a] person about to give up his skin for the hope of retaining his bones." Id. It is
my belief that these definitions, although one-sided, capture the popular frustration
with the civil justice system.
10. See A. VANDERBILT, THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFORM 3-75 (1955) (an historical review of efforts to avoid delay in the courts).
11. Rosenberg & Sovern, Delay and the Dynamics of Personal Injury Litigation, 59
COLUM. L. REV. 1115 (1959). Rosenberg studied accident litigation with respect to
claims handling and the survivability of claims that were filed in court. He found a
positive relationship between several variables and case "durability." See also H.
ZEISEL, H. KALVEN & B. BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT (1959) [hereinafter DELAY
IN THE COURT].

12. See Rosenberg, CivilJustice Research and CivilJustice Reform, 15 LAw & Soc.
473 (1981), for an evaluation of recent empirical research.
13. See Galanter,Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 4 (1983); Miller & Sarat, Grievances, Claims & Disputes: Assessing the Adversary
REV.
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landscape of disputes would resemble a pyramid with only the very
tip of the pyramid representing those disputes that result in lawsuits. 1 4 In recent years, the rate of lawsuits filed per capita has increased. However, there is no reliable data indicating whether the
percentage of disputes resulting in lawsuits has similarly increased.' 5 Therefore, it is uncertain whether the increase in filings
per capita is simply reflective of the fact that the entire pyramid of
disputes has expanded.' 6
Contemporaneous with the expansion of court filings is a shift
in the composition of the civil docket from contract, property, and7
debt collection disputes to cases involving family law and tort.'
Moreover, there is a perceived shift in the work of the judiciary.
The work of the courts may have changed over time in that fewer
Culture, 15 LAw & Soc. REV. 525, 527 (1981). The definition in the text is a paraphrase of the definition used by the above cited authors. Injuries occur in society
that give rise to grievances. When a grievance is articulated, it becomes a claim. A
dispute is the result of a denied claim.
14. Galanter, supra note 13, at 12-13.
15. There are approximately eight million lawsuits filed each year. The Civil
Litigation Research Project (CLRP) found that 11.2% of the disputes in its study
resulted in the commencement of a lawsuit. Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer &
Grossman, Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 85-87 (1983) [hereinafter Costs of OrdinaryLitigation]. Although longitudinal data regarding the number of
disputes is not available, Lempert used population statistics as a surrogate.
Lempert found an increase in disputes over time with particularly sharp increases
arising from expanding automobile usage and accidents. Lempert, More Tales of Two
Courts: Exploring Changes in the "Dispute Settlement Function" of Trial Courts, 13 LAw &
Soc. REV. 91 (1978).
16. Although beyond the scope of this Article, the postulated expansion of the
dispute pyramid is consistent with the anecdotal observation that there certainly
seems to be more to fight about in today's society. New prohibitions and new statutory, regulatory, and constitutional entitlements abound. Caution should be exercised, however, because the disputing pyramid is subject to contraction as well as
expansion. Galanter, supra note 13, at 19. Further, the suggestion that the disputing pyramid may have expanded should not be confused with the assertion that
American society is overly litigious or that we are currently experiencing an unprecedented litigation explosion. Indeed, Galanter makes a significant argument to the
contrary. Id. at 54-71.
17. ARTHUR YOUNG & Co., AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN FAMILY AND COMMERCIAL DIsPUTEs, FINAL REPORT at V-I (May 1980); Friedman & Percival, A Tale of Two Courts: Litigation in Alameda andSan Benito Counties, 10 LAW & Soc.
REV. 267 (1976) [hereinafter Tale of Two Courts]. An interesting research question,
which for methodological reasons will probably escape a definitive answer, is
whether tort and family law cases involve bargaining patterns, discovery practices,
or other features that distinguish them from property and commercial actions. It
can be argued that the stakes involved in tort actions, the uncertainty of the governing legal rules, the open-ended nature of damages for pain and suffering, and
the existence of silent parties asserting liens against any potential recovery create a
set of "bargaining counters" or "bargaining endowments" that radically differ from
the rules of law for property and contract related disputes.
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cases are resolved through an adjudicative act.' 8 Ninety percent or
more of all civil cases settle prior to trial, 9 and a substantial portion
of the cases that do reach trial settle prior to a verdict. There is also
evidence that cases involving relatively larger stakes tend to remain
on the civil docket longer than smaller cases.20
The frequency of settlement in civil litigation has led to an increased interest in the study of attorney behavior, as well as negotiation-the principal activity of attorneys. 2 1 From the work of several
authors, a model of attorney behavior has emerged that may be a
key to understanding civil case behavior. Litigation is a bargaining
process in which the participants in a dispute routinely use the legal
system to engage in a form of "private ordering."' 22 The filing of a
complaint, the rules of procedure, the substantive rules of law, the
anticipated outcome of trial, and even the right of appeal become
bargaining chips in this conflict.
For most civil cases, the courts, along with the substantive and
procedural rules, provide a context for negotiations yielding a private dispute resolution. Negotiation is an interactive process in
which each adversary may engage in a range of behaviors designed
to achieve his goals. This range of behaviors may involve any
number of tactics designed to alter the perceptions of an adversary,
including an appeal to normative standards, projections as to the
trial outcome, intimidation, and oppression.
Each adversary, therefore, uses the procedural and substantive
rules as "bargaining counters. '23 For example, the defense attorney who succeeds in obtaining the right to depose the plaintiff's expert witness without exposing her own expert witnesses to
18. See ARTHUR YOUNG & Co., supra note 17, at V-1; Tale of Two Courts, supra
note 17, at 284-86 (noting a decline in contested cases). But see Lempert, supra note
15, at 133. Lempert persuasively argues that, although the mix ofjudicial business
may have changed over time, there is no evidence to suggest that courts are functionally less important today as dispute settlers. Caution also should be exercised
because all but one of the courts included in the Arthur Young study had jurisdictional ceilings of less than $10,000.00. See also Clark, Adjudication to Administration:A
StatisticalAnalysis of Federal District Courts in the Twentieth Centuy, 55 S. CAL. L. REV.
65, 77 (1981).
19. Costs of Ordinay Litigation, supra note 15, at 87.
20. Rosenberg & Sovern, supra note 11, at 1137-38.
21. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161
(1986); Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984); Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargainingin
the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979); Costs of Ordinary
Litigation, supra note 15.
22. Eisenberg, PrivateOrderingThrough Negotiation:Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 639 (1976). Eisenberg argues that adjudication related
negotiation, rather than principally involving threat, bluff, and horse trading, consists "largely of the invocation, elaboration, and distinction of principles, rules and
precedents." Id.
23. Galanter, supra note 13, at 32-34.
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deposition has accomplished somewhat of a coup. The conventional wisdom tells us that the defense attorney has thereby enhanced her ability to prevail at trial or, at the very least, has greatly
increased the apprehension of opposing counsel with respect to
possible trial outcomes. This increase in apprehension relates directly to the risk assessment made by the plaintiff's counsel in this
example, and very well may cause her to initiate a procedure such as
a motion to disqualify one of the defendant's witnesses. All of these
moves and countermoves have a direct bearing on the respective
assessments of the plaintiff and defense counsel, their willingness to
pursue an actual trial, and their dollar evaluations of the case.
Throughout the process described in the above example, attorneys, and hence their clients, make investment decisions regarding
money expended in pursuit of litigation goals (or other goals that
may have motivated commencement of the suit in the first instance),
and decisions regarding the investment of attorney time.24 This interactive investment model is depicted in Figure 1.25 The model
26
counts for the interactive nature of attorney investment decisions
in which an action by one attorney gives rise to a reciprocal counteraction by his opponent.2 7
As the cost and complexity of trial increases, the possible outcome of the trial becomes a source of bargaining that can be used at
other phases of the process. An enlarged right of appeal, for example, is not merely a possibility that is encountered at a late stage of
the proceedings, but it is also a source of counters and stratagems
throughout the process.28
The implications of this model are far reaching. A direct conclusion may be that scarce resources might be better allocated to
facilitating the negotiation behavior of attorneys and litigants. A corollary conclusion is that too much attention has been given to shaping procedural rules in a coercive sense and providing a date certain
for trial.29 Restated, negotiation is not a formless, unstructured
24. Although attorney time certainly can be evaluated in terms of money, the
model characterizes them separately. Quantification of time in monetary terms
proved difficult. See Costs of OrdinaryLitigation, supra note 15, at 76.

25. The model in Figure 1 was developed by the CLRP. Id. at 107.
26. The CLRP model accounts for factors that will influence the conduct initiated by an attorney participant and the reaction of opposing counsel. These factors
include risk preference, anticipated return, and case characteristics.
27. Trubek found that "no more than half the time lawyers spend on cases can
be attributed to ... procedural events," and that events were a surrogate for the
effect of strategic interaction. Costs of Ordinary Litigation, supra note 15, at 107.
28. Galanter, supra note 13, at 46-47; see Engel & Steele, Civil Cases and Society:
Process and Orderin the CivilJusticeSystem, 2 AM. B. FOUND. REs.J. 295, 308-17 (1979).
29. The conventional wisdom long has held that a key to the disposition of civil
cases is the certainty of a trial date. According to this view, a firm trial date forces
disputants to conclude their bargaining or proceed to trial. See SOLOMON, supra note
5, at 5. But see Flanders, supra note 7, at 33. Flanders found limited support for the
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COSTS OF ORDINARY LITIGATION

A CAUSAL MODEL OF LITIGATION INVESTMENT
Plaintiff Variables
Case Characteristics
Nature of Participants
Participant Goalsat
Processing and Management
Plaintiff
Hours
Plaintiff
Initiated
Events
Ix

- Events

Defendant
Initiated
Events
Defendant
Hours
Defendant Variables
Case Characteristics
Nature of Participants
Participant Goals
Processing and Management
FIGURE 1
process; 30 and attention might better be placed on developing
3
events substantially prior to trial that facilitate negotiations. '
notion that a specific trial date speeds the disposition of civil cases. The sample
size, however, was too small to support any hard conclusions. The interactive
model of attorney negotiations suggests that increased emphasis should be placed
on facilitating negotiations through both formal and informal means. See infra Part
V of this Article.
30. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 21, at 817-18.
31. One group of commentators state:
But if in the world of ordinary litigation judges rarely reach formal decisions on the merits, the parties negotiate, albeit "in the shadow of the
law," judges actively intervene to encourage settlement, and settlement is
the rule, not the exception, then perhaps the whole reform debate falls
wide of the mark. Perhaps the right approach is not to reach for wholly
new institutional alternatives to a hypothetical process of adjudication, but
to understand the non-adjudicative dimensions of litigation, to see how
and why they work, and to seek to make this dimension of the litigation
process even more central and effective.
Costs of Ordinary Litigation, supra note 15, at 122.
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B. Adjudicative and Administrative Behavior
With the pressure of increased civil case filings has come
greater scrutiny of the role of the judiciary. Because dispositions
are far more likely to occur through settlement rather than through
an adjudicative event, 2 the courts are now less often viewed as arenas within which the judiciary resolves disputes by screening facts
through a series of normative rules. Increasingly, the courts and the
judiciary are seen as caseflow managers. 3 In this new paradigm, the
judge sits at the end of a sequence of events to screen and evaluate
the process of a case and nudge it toward settlement when possible.
Thus, the courts are viewed as mechanical systems in which disputes
are steered and managed from commencement toward a disposition, removing them from the active docket.3 4 Within this paradigm, there is no qualitative distinction between a disposition
3 5
resulting from a verdict and one resulting from settlement.
Most judges spend the majority of their workhours in trial.
Only a small portion of time is allocated to motion and pretrial conferences. 3 6 Judges vary with respect to the proportion of time they
allocate to and in the level of assertiveness with which they encourage settlement. The measurement of judicial impact on case
settlement is difficult because most cases settle; therefore, measurement must be derived from participant observation or through an
examination of the content of the settlement without the benefit of a
control group.3 7
32. But see Kritzer, supra note 21, at 163-65. The routine settlement of cases
does not mean settlement free from judicial involvement. Judicial actions and orders short of a dispositive order are common in a substantial portion of the cases.
Kritzer states: "IT]he settlement of many (ifnot most) cases relies upon the adjudication of others; to decouple those that settle from those that are adjudicated
misses the fundamental reality underlying the workings of the system." Id. at 165.
33. The amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 in 1983 was based
on a view of the trial judge as an efficient case manager who makes an appropriate
intervention early in the life of a case. "[W]hen a trial judge intervenes personally
at an early stage to assume judicial control over a case and to schedule dates for
completion by the parties of the principal pretrial steps, the case is disposed of by
settlement or trial more efficiently and with less cost and delay ... " Flanders, supra
note 7, at 17. See also Amendments - FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note,
97 F.R.D. 165, 207 (1983) [hereinafter Advisory Committee's Note].
34. The perception of the role of thejudge in civil litigation may have changed;
The empirical studies, however, shed little light on the historic practices of the judiciary or the allocation ofjudicial time.
35. Some authors have expressed discomfort with the ratio of settlements to
adjudications and the relative prominence of settlement. See Resnik, Managerial
Judges and Court Delay: The Unproven Assumptions, 23 JUDGE J. 8 (Winter 1984); Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).

36. J.

KAKALIK

& R. Ross,

COSTS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM

12-13 (Rand

Inst. CivilJustice 1983). See also Costs of OrdinaryLitigation, supra note 15, at 92, for a
discussion of attorney allocation of time.
37. For example, the attorneys and the parties could be interviewed. The set-

540

UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 67:531

Several studies have attempted to examine the impact of judicial intervention on the settlement process."8 Only five to ten percent of civil cases reach trial; the vast majority of cases settle.
Settlement, however, does not necessarily occur free of direct or indirect judicial involvement. Judicial rulings on evidentiary, venue,
discovery, and other motions may motivate the settlement of a particular case, and may even impact related or similar cases.
Kritzer found evidence of judicial involvement in 31% of the
dispositions that occurred in the Civil Litigation Research Project
(CLRP) sample.3 ' The most significant observation connected to
these studies is that excessive amounts ofjudicial time spent in nurturing settlements is nonproductive. 4" The data indicates that
judges who are more interventionist oriented are involved in
roughly the same number of trials and settlements as the judges
who are less active in their attempts to settle civil cases. 4 1 Moreover, most cases involve
relatively little discovery42 and presumably
43
bargaining.
routine
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that civil case settlement patterns are somehow immune to efforts to expedite settlement prior to trial. There is some support for the proposition that
arbitration/mediation programs 4 4 and case screening programs 4 5
expedite civil case dispositions.
tlement amount may be directly related to the intervention of the judge in altering
perceptions or providing a solution that had not been entertained.
38. M. ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVEJUSTICE: A CONTROLLED TEST IN PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION (Colum. U. Press 1964); Kritzer, The
Judge's Role in PretrialCase Processing:Assessing the Needfor Change, 66 JUDICATURE 28

(1982) [hereinafter TheJudge's Role].
39. Kritzer, supra note 21, at 164.
40. ROSENBERG, supra note 38, at 28-29. Rosenberg's study indicated that pretrials involved large amounts of judge time without appreciable savings as measured by the number or timing of settlements. See also Flanders, supra note 7, at 37-

39.
41.

Flanders, supra note 7, at 37-39. But see Church, The "Old and the New" Con-

ventional Wisdom of Court Delay, 7 JUST. Sys.J. 395, 399-405 (1982).
42. Flanders, supra note 7, at 27; Costs of OrdinaryLitigation,supra note 15, at 91.
43. See TheJudge's Role, supra note 38, at 38. Kritzer makes the distinction between "mass production" or routine cases and civil cases involving the allocation of
substantially greater resources and attention.
44. See Weller, Ruhnka & Martin, Compulsory Civil Arbitration: The Rochester Answer to Court Backlogs, 20JUDGEJ. 36 (1981). This study involved mandatory arbitra-

tion for cases with less than $6,000 in controversy. Weller found a precipitous
drop in prehearing settlements and a reduction in the amount of time cases awaited
hearing after having been prepared. See also E. LIND &J. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF
COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 76-77 (Federal
Judicial Center 1981). Lind and Shapard found that in two of the three courts stud-

ied, arbitration led to more rapid dispositions, primarily of cases that did not reach
arbitration.
45.

Planet, Smith, Olson & Connolly, Screeningand Tracking Civil Cases; Managing

Diverse Caseloadsin the District of Columbia, 8 JUST. SYS. J. 338 (1983).
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C. Civil Case Processing Methods and Procedures
Delayed cases, although chronic, are not inevitable. Church,4 6
Mahoney,4 7 and Flanders4" are principally responsible for the development of a general, structural profile of relatively fast and relatively slow courts. Both Church and Mahoney studied several
metropolitan court systems, including the Third Judicial .Circuit.
Both compared the median times of disposition for civil cases and
tort cases and the median time to trial. The Third Judicial Circuit
was found to be a relatively slow court. The Church study found
that the median time to disposition for all cases was nine hundred
four days, and the median time to trial was 1,231 days.4 9 Mahoney's
study found a median time to jury trial in Wayne County, Michigan,
50
of 1,127 days.
Church and Mahoney both found wide disparities from the
slowest to the fastest courts studied. Neither Church nor Mahoney
directly addressed whether the case mix or composition of the civil
dockets of the courts studied might somehow account for the observed disparities in disposition times.5" Flanders partially addressed this issue when he observed that slower courts tend to
dispose of all cases in a relatively slow manner with the more complex cases providing the slowest disposition times, whereas the relatively fast courts disposed of all civil cases in a relatively fast
manner, including the more complex cases. 52 Flanders found the
factors distinguishing fast and slow courts included:
The fastest courts are those with the most exacting
controls.
In the fastest courts, the amount of lost or unused time
is minimized.
In the fastest courts, more actions leading to disposition are accomplished during the time the case is on
the docket, even though it remains there for less time
than it would in a slower court.
In the fastest courts, the interval between each individ46. JusTicE DELAYED, supra note 4.
47. See IMPLEMENTING DELAY REDUCTION, supra note 4.
48. Id. at 8.
49. JUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 4, at 94.
50. IMPLEMENTING DELAY REDUCTION, supra note 4, at 8.
51. The authors noted the possibility that some courts may be slower because
of the percentage of complex or serious cases filed. Id. at 12.
52. Flanders, supra note 7, at 18-19. Flanders concluded that case complexity
alone did not account for the observed disparities in case processing time. Flanders' conclusion that case complexity bears only a slight relationship to delay (if
any) was based on his observation that relatively fast courts process all cases relatively fast. This reasoning does not account for the possibility that complex cases
pose more serious problems for slower courts and may well have had an historic
role in the development of a case backlog.
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ual action is less than in slower courts. Yet in all
courts, even the fastest, there is considerable time between court actions.
Finally, this data indicates that there is a great deal of
unused time in slower courts, time that reasonably
could 53
be reduced through more docket control by the
court.

Flanders noted that huge disparities in case preparation time, the
allocation of judge time in monitoring civil cases, and the court's
role in settlement distinguished fast from slow courts.5 4
Flanders, Church, and Mahoney do not offer a definitive theory
explaining case management and case behavior, but one lesson appears clear: the habits, customs, and inclinations of the bench and
bar are causative factors in creating or eliminating delay in civil case
processing. 5 This approach to explaining delayed courts has been
branded as abstract, teleological,5 6 and lacking in explanatory
power.57 Notwithstanding these criticisms, the "legal culture" concept correctly focuses on commonly held perceptions and norms as
an influence in case dispositions. The dispelling of some myths with
respect to several structural variables, including the size of court
and number of judges, and an accompanying shift toward a more
norm-centered view of the civil justice system, is an important contribution to our understanding of courts.
Court systems throughout the United States have developed
numerous approaches to processing civil cases. These include computer docketing, case screening and case evaluation, private justice
53. Id. at 19. Because the factors observed by Flanders occur notwithstanding
variation in case type and complexity, Flanders argues that the litigation culture is
probably the principal factor affecting civil case disposition times. Thus, for Flanders, the aggregate will and habits of participants in the legal process determine the
amount of time necessary to process civil disputes.
54. Faster courts generally had automatic procedures assuring strict monitoring of cases. In addition, judges spent little time in conference and had little connection to settlement efforts. Id. at ix.
55. Church, in defining the term "local legal culture," states: "[Bloth speed
and backlog are determined in large part by established expectations, practices,
and informal rules of behavior of judges and attorneys." JusTiCE DELAYED, supra
note 4, at 54 (emphasis omitted).
56. Grossman, Kritzer, Bulmiller & Dougal, Measuringthe Pace of Civil Litigation,
65 JUDICATURE 86, 112 (1981).
57. One group of commentators characterizes the concept as abstract and untested. Id. There has not been an empirical validation that participants within
delayed court systems hold norms that differ significantly from participants within
systems that are not delayed. Id. at 93. Moreover, there is at least the suggestion
that in urban areas with both state and federal courts, "it seems unlikely that the
range of informal influences, the characteristics unique to particular courts, and the
motivations of court personnel and attorneys can be lumped together into a single
residual category dubbed 'local legal culture.' " Id. at 102.
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systems, and mediation and arbitration.58 Mediation has been
trumpeted, including by the Third Judicial Circuit, as a key element
in reducing both civil case delay and backlog. 59 The reality, however, is that most of the mediation programs have not substantially,
if at all, reduced civil case processing times.6 0 While diversion,
screening and evaluation, and mediation and arbitration are valuable tools that may provide assistance in expediting civil cases and
advancing the socially worthy goal of rendering more prompt justice, such programs have not been a "quick fix" 6 remedy for the
problem of civil case delay.
Pearson found that mediation and arbitration programs have
generally failed to accomplish many of the goals set for them.62
Voluntary programs have not substantially affected the delay and
cost issues because only a relatively small number of cases have
been submitted to them. 63 In addition, such programs have not
demonstrated a substantial cost savings. Noting the Third Judicial
Circuit as a possible exception, Pearson concludes that "[d]espite
the expectations of many, mediation and arbitration appear to have
negligible effects on civil trial calendars."'
Similar observations also have been made with respect to compulsory arbitration in Rochester County, New York.65 Although the
Rochester program greatly reduced attorney preparation time and
58. For a general review of arbitration programs, see Hensler, What We Know
and Don't Know About Court-AdministeredArbitration, 69 JUDICATURE 270 (1986). See
also P. EBENER & D. BETANCOURT, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION: THE NATIONAL
PICTURE (Rand Inst. CivilJustice 1985) [hereinafter COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION].
In most state courts, arbitration is limited to cases involving $15,000 or less. Arbitration programs are primarily utilized for smaller claims. Id. at 9-17.

59.
60.

See Settling Cases in Detroit, supra note 4, at 307-08.
Pearson, supra note 1, at 436.

IMPLEMENTING DELAY REDUCTION, supra note 4, at 2.
62. Pearson, supra note 1, at 426. The author states:
[M]ediation and arbitration fail to achieve many of the performance goals
posited for them by those concerned with court congestion and cost savings. In particular, voluntary mediation and arbitration programs frequently fail to attract sizable numbers of disputants and have negligible
impact on court caseloads. While mediation and arbitration program
costs vary greatly with the size of caseload, most programs are generally
more expensive per case than courts.
Id. The Third Judicial Circuit's program differs markedly from the programs reviewed by Pearson. In addition to being mandatory, the program apparently involves negligible costs for most litigants given the amounts involved in the disputes
subject to mediation. Moreover, the vast majority of the programs have a ceiling of
$15,000. The Third Judicial Circuit's program is unique in that it applies to the full
range of civil cases filed in the circuit court involving a minimum of $10,000.

61.

63.

Id. See also Christensen, PrivateJustice: California's General Reference Procedure,

1 AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 79 (1982).
64. See Pearson, supra note 1, at 438.
65. Weller, Ruhnka & Martin, supra note 44, at 41-43.
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the use of pretrial discovery, "[tlotal case processing time was not
reduced."'66 Apparently the observed reduction in elapsed time
from the "note of issue" to final disposition was offset by an expansion in the time used by attorneys to prepare their cases prior to the
"note of issue." The Rochester experience illustrates that the civil
67
justice process is a complex system with adaptive mechanisms.
Whether it be compulsory arbitration in Rochester or mandatory
mediation in the Third Judicial Circuit, such programs do not by
themselves provide a "quick fix" for delayed or congested civil case
dockets.
Most, if not all, of the literature reviewing structural variables
or dispute resolution approaches share a lack of any strong association between a key structural variable and case disposition patterns.
This absence of a definitive association enhances the importance of
investigation based on the interaction of the participants within the
civil justice system; the role and beliefs ofjudges and the interaction
of attorneys with the courts are of primary concern.
III.
A.

BACKGROUND

Mediation in the Third Judicial Circuit

The Third Judicial Circuit has general subject matter jurisdiction over civil matters involving $10,000 or more in controversy.68
The geographic area encompassed by the court is co-extensive with
the boundaries of Wayne County, Michigan, which includes the city
of Detroit. Approximately 20,000 civil cases are filed in the court
each calendar year, excluding domestic cases. 69 The thirty-five
judges who currently constitute the bench are elected for six-year
terms on a nonpartisan ballot.
In 1984, judges operated on the basis of a hybrid master calendar system.70 Each case filed in the court received an alphanumeric
66. Id. at 43.
67. See Engel & Steele, Civil Cases and Society: Process and Order in the Civil Justice
System, 2 AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 295 (1979). The civil justice system has interactive
components. It maintains a dynamic equilibrium through feedback loops that are
affected by external forces. One such external force may be law office economics.
This view of the civil justice system leads Engel and Steele to conclude: "A particular desired state of affairs cannot be created simply by selecting attractive procedures or structures from other settings or from one's own imagination with the
expectation that they will function automatically in the desired manner." Id. at 333.
They identify two paradigms of civil justice: mechanistic and organic. Id. at 338.
68. See MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 13 (1963); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.601
(West 1981).
69. Domestic cases involve divorce and all issues arising therefrom, including
child custody, division of marital assets, and alimony.
70. Cases filed in the court are assigned by means of a "blind draw" to a pretrial judge who is responsible for the case until the settlement conference during
the thirtieth month. Settlement conference judges may hold a case for a brief pe-
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designation, identifying it by date of filing and by case type. For
example, malpractice cases were customarily designated as "NM,"
and cases involving products liability (personal injury) were designated "NP."' The case type designations were made at the plaintiff's counsel's election at the time each case was filed. During the
fifteenth month, cases were screened and evaluated by law clerks to
determine whether they met the circuit court's jurisdictional
threshold.72
A search for alternatives by the Wayne County bench and bar
was prompted by delayed civil cases and sharp debate regarding the
impact of a new no-fault automobile insurance and liability statute."
In the early 1970s, a committee comprised of representatives from
the plaintiff's bar, the defense bar, and the bench was established.
This committee was responsible for the original mediation rule,
which was aimed at eliminating the backlog and expediting a glut of
automobile accident case filings. Other civil cases were also eligible
for mediation, but only by stipulation of the parties. After a brief
period of claimed success, 4 mediation fell into disuse.75
Mediation was resurrected in 1979. In 1984, mediation in the
ThirdJudicial Circuit was governed by a local court rule. 7 1 The Mediation Tribunal Association (MTA) is now responsible for the dayto-day administration of the program. The MTA is an independent
corporation that has a board of directors comprised of the Chief
Judge of the court and one representative each from the Detroit Defense Counsel Association (DDCA) and the Detroit Chapter of the
American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA). Funding for MTA is
riod to facilitate settlement. If the settlement conference does not produce a settlement, cases are assigned to the next available trial judge. Recently, the court
initiated a program intended to shift from a hybrid master to an individual calendar. Ultimately, the same judge will carry a case on her docket from filing through
trial.
71. For a description of the various categories, see Appendix.
72. Screening is conducted on the basis of written guidelines that focus on
whether the case involves a sufficient amount in controversy and whether the case
should be selected for early mediation. In 1984 screening occurred in the fourteenth month. Early mediation hearings were usually scheduled in the eighteenth
month.
73. See Bowles, Mediation New Dimension in Decision-Making, 51 MIcH. B. J. 176
(1972); Miller, Mediation in Michigan, 56 JUDICATURE 290 (1973).
74.

The program was credited with a role in reducing disposition time from

forty-eight to thirty-six months.
75. Factors contributing to disuse, which are frequently mentioned by those
familiar with the original mediation program, are insufficient financial resources,

inefficient use ofjudicial time, and inefficient docketing. But see Settling Cases in Detroit, supra note 4.

76. Authorization to operate under local rules that deviate from the rules contained in the Michigan General Court Rules was obtained from the Michigan
Supreme Court. The mediation rule now applicable to the entire state of Michigan
borrows liberally from the Third Judicial Circuit's local rule.
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derived from a fee that is levied on each party to a civil action subject to mediation. 77 As a freestanding corporation, MTA is not subject to the vagaries of county and state funding and is free from the
threat of fund diversion.78
The administrative operation of the MTA is substantially computerized. Routinely, case records are downloaded from the court's
mainframe computer to a computer operated by the MTA. The
MTA can thereby operate independent of the administrative operation of the circuit court and can routinely establish the mediation
docket and issue appropriate notices. The docket involves two
tracks. During the case evaluation process, pleadings are screened
to identify cases that are likely to involve less than $10,000 in controversy. These cases are scheduled for early mediation, which occurs in the eighteenth month. Cases believed clearly to involve
more than $10,000 in controversy and complex issues comprise the
later mediation docket. Later mediation cases are scheduled for
hearing in the twenty-seventh month.
The MTA clerk oversees the mediation docket. The clerk's duties include selecting individuals to sit on a mediation panel from
the mediator lists, and assigning cases to specific panels of
mediators. No one can be selected as a mediator without at least
five years of trial experience. 79 Generally, mediators with relatively
less trial and mediation experience are assigned to early mediation
panels.8 0
All civil cases, excluding domestic cases and cases primarily involving equitable relief, that are filed in the Third Judicial Circuit
are mediated. In reference to the Wayne County program, the term
"mediation" is something of a misnomer. The program does not
involve some of the features associated with the typical conception
of mediation. Mediation is usually described as a voluntary process
in which one or more mediators facilitate the efforts of disputants to
reach a resolution of their dispute.8 ' The Third Judicial Circuit's
program is more aptly described as a sophisticated form of case
77. The fee is $75.00. See MICH. WAYNE COUNT CIR. CT. R. 403.8 (1984).
78. This has raised some debate regarding the allocation of substantial surpluses generated by the program each year. In 1986, MTA made a substantial contribution to the court, which facilitated the purchase of much needed computer
hardware.
79. Both plaintiff and defense mediators must have at least five years of trial
experience in the Third Judicial Circuit. Retired judges are frequently selected as
neutrals.
80. Later mediation evaluates almost all of the professional malpractice and
products liability cases. This assignment system generally results in the more complex cases being assigned to the more experienced mediators. The mean mediation amount for cases mediated early was $18,354 (1,538 cases). The mean
mediation for cases mediated later was $77,878 (1,583 cases).
81. Pearson, supra note 1, at 423.
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evaluation. Each case is evaluated by a tripartite panel, which consists of one plaintiff attorney, one defense attorney, and a neutral
attorney. The panel reviews mediation briefs filed on behalf of each
party, holds a hearing of approximately thirty minutes, and immediately renders a dollar valuation for the case.8 2
During the study, more than twenty case mediations were observed. Most hearings lasted less than thirty minutes.8 3 In that brief
period of time, the weaknesses of each adversarial position quickly
became the focus of discussion. Adversarial presentations of each
litigant's case were made, and the panel spoke with each attorney
separately.8 4 After the presentations, the mediation panel deliberated in private. Those deliberations involved assessments of the
weaknesses in the positions taken by the advocates, and evaluations
of the amount necessary to settle the case in view of the competing
expectations of the attorneys. Some of the mediators also considered intangibles, such as the trial abilities of the lawyers.
After the mediation hearing and private deliberations by the
panel, an evaluation is rendered, including not only a dollar amount
but also a "characterization" of the decision. The mediators are required to select one of the following characterizations: equity nonunanimous, equity unanimous, liability non-unanimous, liability
unanimous, party not mediated, remain in circuit court non-unanimous, non-unanimous panel, unanimous panel. Mediation panels
render a unanimous result in more than 80% of the cases.
Both equity characterizations result in removal of the case to
the district court. The non-unanimous characterizations eliminate
the future possibility of sanctions against a party who rejects the
evaluation. The mediation rule authorizes sanctions, including reasonable attorney fees, when a party rejects a unanimous result and
does not improve his position through trial. The rejecting party
must improve his position by a factor of 10% after costs and interest
(if any) on the verdict have been calculated.8 5
B.

Scope of the Study

The initial focus of the mediation study was to evaluate the
Third Judicial Circuit's mediation program. Direct measurement of
the impact of mediation on case dispositions is difficult because
82. See infra Part IV for further discussion of the mediation hearing.
83. Some of the hearings lasted only fifteen minutes. One hearing involving an
exploding truck tire and allegedly defective wheel and rim assembly lasted almost
one hour.
84. In most cases the panel spoke in private with each attorney immediately
after the oral presentations.
85. MiCH. CT. R. 2.403(0) (1985). The prevailing view is that sanctions have
not played a significant role in driving the system. See Miller, supra note 73, at 294;
Settling Cases in Detroit, supra note 4, at 309.
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there is little, if any, reliable data on disposition patterns during the
years immediately prior to the institution of the mediation program.
Even if reliable data regarding disposition patterns were available,
the measurement task would still be difficult because other confounding variables, such as the institution of a case screening and
evaluation program and several "crash programs- 8 6 conducted in
the 19 7 0s, undeniably have had some impact on disposition patterns. Measurement is further confounded by a probable shift in the
attitudes about delay held by the bench, bar, and court administrators.8 7 Therefore, the many claims regarding the positive impact of
the mediation program on the court's backlog cannot be supported
by empirical data.
Because of these limitations, the descriptive data is used to
"map" 8 8 the caseflow process in the Third Judicial Circuit.
Through graphic depiction of case terminations, the temporal relationship between the mediation event8 9 and case dispositions is
demonstrated. The disposition pattern of mediation, as compared
with disposition patterns for other events, provides a basis for understanding the relative significance of the mediation event. This
86. In late 1979, the Wayne County Circuit Court engaged in what was commonly known as the "crash program." This program involved borrowing judges
from other courts and the imposition of strict time limits for pretrial events. The
program is credited with reducing the time from filing to trial from forty-eight
months to thirty months. See Gilmore, Comment Upon The 'Old' and 'New' Conventional
Wisdom Of Court Delay, 7JusT. Sys.J. 413, 413-14 (1982). See also Dunn, MediationA Viable Method of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 65 MIcH. B. J. 894 (1986) (time to
trial in 1977 reached fifty months).
87. The establishment of bench and bar cooperation in the mediation program
and various other programs instituted by the court reflect increasing concern with
the issue of delay. Attitudinal shifts, changes in personnel, and changes in substantive and procedural rules illustrate that courts are dynamic, everchanging systems
that render laboratory like controls impossible. Although several survey instruments in addition to the data derived from the court's computer was originally intended to be used, the expense associated with the extensive use of questionnaires
required that this portion of the study be postponed. Confining the preliminary
study to cases and case characteristics means that a number of important factors
cannot be accounted for, including relationship of participants, accountability of
attorneys, role perception of participants, and experience of participants. See
Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation:A Study of Strategies in Search of a Theoy, 1983 AM.
B. FOUND. REs.J. 905 (1983).
88. "Mapping" refers to the use of graphics and standard descriptive statistics
to develop an appreciation of what the case processing system is actually doing at
different points along the time continuum from filing to disposition. From such a
baseline, it is then possible to theorize regarding the events, transactions, and factors that affect the case processing system.
89. The terms "event" and "mediation event" are repeatedly used throughout
this Article. The CLRP has developed a model of attorney behavior that conceptualizes procedural events "as a surrogate for the effect of strategic interaction in
litigation." Costs of OrdinaryLitigation,supra note 15, at 106. This perspective proves
helpful in theorizing about why mediation encourages case dispositions.
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comparison, along with literature from several disciplines, then provides the basis for some informed speculation regarding the impact
of mediation on civil cases.
Initially, a population of civil cases consisting of all cases scheduled for mediation during a fixed time period was extracted from
the court's mainframe computer and recorded on magnetic tape.
The tape format incorporates fifty-six original variables9" for each of
the 5,615 civil cases scheduled for mediation during the first six
months of calendar year 1984.91 The tape format also allows subsets of the population of cases to be defined according to one or
more variables and compared to the key variable-disposition age.
In addition, cross sections of cases along any point in the case disposition continuum can be isolated and compared on the basis of any
of the variables. For example, the case type and mediation evaluation amount for cases that terminated within one month of mediation can be compared with the case type and amount for cases when
the mediation award was rejected and the case involved further negotiations or trial.
The preliminary empirical results of the study do not directly
affirm the thesis that the Third Judicial Circuit's mediation program
expedites civil case settlement. Rather, the data suggests that mediation can have this effect on the civil case settlement process. Moreover, consideration of mediation's impact on attorney behavior
patterns fits comfortably within the existing models of attorney litigation interaction. These models, along with the data, suggest a
new conception of civil case processing that focus on facilitating the
strategic negotiation behaviors of adversaries significantly in advance of possible trial dates.9 2 Much of what is known or theorized
regarding attorney use of the mediation process and negotiation behaviors is derived from the published and unpublished work of
others.
C.

Summary of Findings
The original foci of the mediation study were as follows:

90. The term "original variables" designates the variables that were a part of
the data maintained on the court's computer. "New variables" designates the variables that were created by using arithmetic calculations. For example, the new variable "dispage" was created by subtracting the date of filing from the date of'
disposition. For further discussion of the tape format and variables, see Appendix.
91. Family law (divorce, child custody, division of marital assets, etc.) cases and
suits involving primarily equitable relief are not part of the data set as they are not
subject to the mediation procedures described in this Article.
92. In stating that a "new" conception of civil case processing is appropriate, I
do not mean to imply that I am the first to approach civil litigation from a perspective that emphasizes strategic negotiations behavior. Indeed, my interest in the issue flows from the work of several authors cited within this Article.
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(1) How does the docket operate in terms of the number of
cases that mediate early, mediate late, and do not mediate?
(2) Within the categories of early, late, and not mediated, is
there a settlement pattern that may be linked to the event of
mediation?
(3) Do all case types behave similarly in the pretrial phase with
regard to mediation?
(4) Are there case types that are unresponsive to mediation?
There is a positive correlation between the event of mediation
and case dispositions. The significance of mediation is not limited
to the hearing. Mediation's impact cannot be measured merely in
terms of the number of cases that accept or reject the mediation
evaluation. Rather, mediation or receipt of a notice indicating that
mediation has been scheduled operates as a trigger to negotiations
and decision making, resulting in case dispositions.
During the early phase of the research, it was anticipated that
the data would demonstrate that disposition patterns covariate with
case type. That proposition cannot be substantiated given the twotrack mediation system. The case types of real estate, products liability, and medical malpractice behave differently, but their distinct
patterns do not mean that they are substantially less responsive to
mediation. These three case types are not screened at fifteen
months by case evaluators for possible early mediation scheduling.
They are exclusively set for late mediation; they are presumed to
involve sufficient complexity and a sufficient amount in controversy.
This explains, at least in part, why their mean disposition ages were
substantially greater than those types with a more even distribution
between early mediation and later mediation. Case screening procedures likely result in the docketing of a larger percentage of the
less durable cases for early mediation.
Case typology and evaluation procedures do not completely explain the magnitude of the difference in mean disposition ages for
early and later mediated cases. Attorney interviews and relevant
literature from several disciplines, including anthropology, court
administration, and dispute resolution, suggest that the time of mediation-early versus late-is the principal variable related to case
life span.
The most significant finding regarding disposition behavior
patterns by case type is that the mediation events signal the beginning of bargaining and case settlement in the majority of cases
scheduled for mediation. This finding suggests that genuine efforts
to commence negotiations and settle may be delayed when, because
of the two-track mediation system, mediation is deliberately delayed
in cases where bargaining might otherwise have commenced.
The correlation of the mediation event to case disposition is
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positive, but the more profound questions concerning attorney behavior, attorney use of the mediation process in a strategic sense,
and why this correlation exists require further research. Civil litigation can be viewed as a game in which attorneys engage in interactive, strategic behavior. Counsel for plaintiff and defendant use the
rules of law and procedure to develop bargaining chips. Mediation,
in a strategic sense, is an important event. Litigants elect to undergo or avoid mediation for strategic reasons. In mediated cases,
the evaluation frequently provides a dollar amount that is acceptable to the disputants or an acceptable range for further negotiation.
Shuart's work in studying the Wayne County mediation program
documents this range finding function.
The mediation hearing incorporates additional important features. It is an adversary proceeding. However, it is also a classroom. More than twenty mediation hearings were observed. The
mediators in each hearing quickly isolated the weakest elements of
plaintiff's and defendant's case. The discussion of relative strengths
and weaknesses was candid and forceful. Frequently, the mediator
designated as representing one side of the dispute (either plaintiff
or defendant) would lead the mediation panel in the disection of
both the plaintiff and the defense positions. The panel critique of
individual presentations appears to teach attorneys about the
strengths and weaknesses of their cases. This direct, informative,
and candid pedagogical element of the case evaluation process may
largely explain why the mediation program is beneficial. In the
words of the former ChiefJudge of the Third Judicial Circuit, Richard Dunn, "What attorney wouldn't want three experienced trial attorneys to evaluate his case?"
IV.

A.

PRESENTATION OF THE DATA

Description and Distribution

Figure 2 is a pie chart depicting the percentage and number of
cases mediated early, mediated later, and not mediated. Roughly
41% of the cases scheduled for mediation either settle or terminate
prior to mediation. The remaining cases are evenly split between
early mediation and later mediation.
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CASES MEDIATED EARLY, LATER, OR NOT AT

ALL: N=5298

28.95%

41.30%
B Med. < 19 mo.
E9 Med. > 19 mo.
93 Not Mediated

29.75%
FIGURE 2
Figure 3 depicts the disposition patterns of early mediation
(MedE), later mediation (MedL), and not mediated (Nomed) cases,
but excludes slightly more than 1,000 cases that were mediated and
then removed
to the district court for lack of sufficient amount in
93
controversy.
Dispositions in each category occur in close relationship to the
issuance of the mediation notice. Each of the three categories, however, has a distinct life, with the Nomed cases being the most dissimilar. Dispositions crest at four points: early mediation, later
mediation, final pretrial conference, and trial. Dispositional activity" increases from issuance of each of the mediation notices and
93. Cases that are evaluated as involving less than $10,000 are routinely scheduled for removal to the district court.
94. "Dispositional activity" and "dispositional transaction" include settlement,
removal to the district court, and the dismissal of abandoned cases. Many of the
cases routed to early mediation do not meet the jurisdictional requirement of
$10,000 or more in controversy. Eleven hundred fifty-nine cases were removed to
the district court. In addition, another segment of the scheduled cases was abandoned.
Early mediation is the first regularly scheduled event on the docket that requires the appearance of counsel. Thus, it is the first event requiring that counsel
report either the settlement or the abandonment of a case.
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crests in close proximity to the mediation event. The crests at the
thirty-sixth and forty-second months depict those cases that either
settle on the courthouse steps or proceed to trial.9 5
The darkened portion of Figure 3 represents the cases scheduled for mediation but not mediated. An indeterminable number of
Nomed dispositions were unrelated to either receipt of the mediation notice or anticipation of the mediation event. This segment of
cases was abandoned or settled prior to the issuance of a mediation
notice. 96 For example, the majority of cases scheduled for early mediation were issued a notice of mediation in the fourteenth month.
A portion of the cases receiving this notice had already ceased to be
active civil actions. Thus, the entry of an order closing abandoned
cases is not related to mediation. Rather, the notice of mediation
stimulated the attorneys to report closed cases to the mediation tribunal and, hence, the court. In this respect, mediation serves a
docket cleaning function. 98 For purposes of this discussion, the
most important segment consists of the cases that do not settle or
otherwise terminate prior to receipt of the notice of mediation.
That segment potentially involves the conscious choice to negotiate
a settlement prior to the mediation event. Settlement subsequent to
receipt of a mediation notice is presumed to imply consideration of
the potential cost and impact of mediation in the process of reaching the settlement outcome. 9 9
95. The court operates a system commonly known as "spin off." Cases that do
not settle during the settlement conference (thirtieth month) are assigned to the
trial "spin off" calendar. As judges become available, cases are moved from "spin
off" and assigned for trial. Theoretically, the first case on the list is entitled to the
first availablejudge. Older cases are given preference. If it becomes obvious that a
case will not be assigned to a trial judge within two weeks (e.g., a thirty-month case
is on the list with numerous thirty-six-month cases), the case will be removed from
the "spin off" docket and given new settlement conference and trial dates six
months in the future. Trials, therefore, usually occur in the thirtieth, thirty-sixth,
and forty-second months.
96. An order recording a final disposition predated the scheduling of mediation in 8.23% of the cases that were not mediated. This subgroup of cases should
not have been scheduled for mediation. Removing these cases from the data set
provides a clearer picture of the impact of mediation on the active civil case docket.
97. Not infrequently, cases are abandoned or settled without notice to the
court. These cases should be distinguished from closed cases that are inadvertently
scheduled for mediation.
98. Prior to the reinstitution of the mediation program in 1979, thousands of
settled and abandoned cases remained on the active docket. During the same period in the late 1970s, the court also instituted new audit procedures designed to
identify "dead" cases. Variances in the way in which different courts maintain data,
and the habits of attorneys in regularly reporting dispositions from one court to
another, make cross-court studies difficult, which rely upon data maintained by
courts.
99. "Conscious choice" means a decision to settle that was made after receipt
of the notice and, therefore, with knowledge that mediation was impending. Shuart
suggests that "the scheduling process alone focuses the parties on settlement, and
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Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between the timing of the
mediation event and the disposition of those cases that were actually
mediated. Figure 4 underrepresents this relationship for two reasons. First, the order closing a case is frequently filed substantially
later than the date on which a settlement was actually consummated.'
Thus, the bars indicating case terminations should
shadow the mediation event more closely than depicted in Figure 4.
Second, for the later mediation, the settlement conference usually
occurs within ninty days of the mediation. In those situations in
which the mediation valuation is rejected (and the case proceeded
beyond mediation toward the final pretrial in the thirtieth month),
the graph does not provide useful information regarding the role of
pretrial conferences on case settlement patterns. Nevertheless, it is
argued that there is significant reason to believe that the mediation
substantially influences many of these cases.
A review of several thousand cases suggests that a significant
number of the cases surviving mediation were greatly influenced by
the mediation event. 0 ' All of the cases in which the disposition
date was the same as the settlement conference dates were reviewed.
In slightly more than 10% of these cases, the settlement conference
was never convened because the settlement conference judge received notice that the case had settled. 102

may cause many parties and their attorneys to opt for immediate settlement negotiations rather than pay the mediation fee or prepare the summaries." Settling Cases in
Detroit, supra note 4, at 313. But see infra Part V, section A., in which it is argued that
the determination to avoid mediation is not merely avoidance of the fee but is a
reflection of a strategic choice that is related to the perceived content of the mediation event.
100. This observation was partially corroborated by a review of the disposition
dates for all cases that were recorded as having settled at the final pretrial conference. Frequently, a settlement recorded at the pretrial conference actually occurred several months prior to the conference. See Appendix for discussion
regarding cleaning the data.
101. This observation is also supported by the study conducted by Shuart. See
Settling Cases in Detroit, supra note 4, at 314-15, and accompanying text.
102. More than one thousand cases had identical settlement conference and disposition dates. The case records, however, demonstrated that settlement conferences were not actually convened in a substantial number of the cases. Rather, the
cases had settled as much as several months prior to the final pretrial conference.
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B.

Case Type, Size of Stake, and Tial Frequency
Table 1 indicates the mean disposition ages for seven case
types; Table 2 contains the trial frequency for nine case types.
MEAN DISPOSITION AGE
(in months)

ALL
LATER
EARLY
NOT
CASE TYPE MEDIATED MEDIATION MEDIATION CATEGORIES
Real Estate
31.24
9.0 *
36.35
27.11
Contract
27.82
23.74
36.55
27.48
General Civil
30.76
24.74
38.28
30.06
Auto P/I
24.94
23.80
35.15
25.13
Malpractice
32.63
18.83*
34.64
32.99
Personal Injury
26.67
24.26
36.42
26.84
Products
36.20
11.0 *
35.31
33.49
Column Total
28.00
23.95
35.95
27.65
• Less than 10 cases in this cell.
TABLE I

NUMBER OF TRIAL BY CASE TYPE AND
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL FOR CASE TYPE
CASE TYPE
Real Estate
Contract
General Civil
Auto P/I
Malpractice
Personal Injury
Products
Dramshop
Other Damage

NUMBER
142
920
651
1,650
442
1,180
218
33
62

NUMBER
TO TRIALS
9
46
53
48
52
61
32
4
6

0
CASE TYPE
6.3
5.0
8.1
2.9
11.8
5.2
14.7
12.1
9.7

TRIALS
2.8
14.7
17.0
16.0
17.0
19.6
10.2

Totals
5,298
311
TRIAL AND TRIAL PERCENTAGES BY FIVE VARIABLES: (1)
terminated prior to mediation; (2) removed prior to mediation; (3)
not mediated; (4) mediated by nineteen months; and (5) mediated
after nineteen months.
TABLE

2

Early mediated and later mediated cases comprise two discrete
tracks with some parallel development. Early mediated cases represent the court's attempt to identify cases that should be screened for
amount in controversy or placed on a "fast" track. Therefore, caution should be exercised in comparing the data. generated for early
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mediated cases with that for later mediated cases. Even the composition of the early mediation and later mediation dockets substantially differ. More than 90% of the malpractice and product liability
cases are scheduled for later mediation. The bulk of the early mediation docket consists of contract, auto personal injury, personal injury, and general civil case types.
The mean disposition age for mediated early cases was 23.95
months, and mean median mediation evaluation amount is approximately $18,354. The mean disposition age for later mediated cases
was 35.95 months, and the mean mediation amount was $77,878.1os
The apparent larger stakes connected with later mediation cases arguably means that they have the tendency to remain on the active
civil docket for longer periods of time than the early mediation
cases, irrespective of the mediation program. Considerable caution
must be exercised with regard to this observation because the
designation as an early mediated or later mediated case may account
for some portion of the difference in the mean disposition age statistic. Otherwise stated, the distinct pattern of dispositions for mediated early cases may be, at least in part, the product of the division
of cases into early and later mediation categories. The shared, system-wide value judgment that some cases are more complex, involve substantially larger stakes, and are therefore entitled to more
extended (and thus more "serious") treatment, may influence mediator and participant perceptions, the magnitude of the mediation
evaluation, and subsequent negotiation behavior. 10 4
Although caution is warranted, the relative difference observed
in the dollar amount of mediation evaluations for product liability
and malpractice case types, as compared with the other case types, is
consistent with the data reported by other observers regarding settlements and jury verdicts.1 0 5 Product liability and malpractice
103. The mediation amount statistics were derived from a slightly different version of the data set. The data set from which Figures 1-4 were derived contained
5,298 cases. The data set from which the mediation amount statistics were derived
contained 5,319 cases. Given the size of the total population, the addition of
twenty-one cases does not alter the perception of the mediation system nor render
the data regarding dollar amount unreliable.
104. The history of the mediation program also underscores the need for caution in comparing cases mediated in the two mediation tracks. It must be
remembered that the plaintiff and defense bars were substantially responsible for
the development of the program and its timetable. It is arguable that the program,
at its inception in 1979, merely adopted already settled expectations concerning
how long it takes to resolve automobile personal injury cases as compared with
medical malpractice or products liability cases.
105. See R. HENSLER, TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION 14-18 (Rand Inst. CivilJustice
1988). Median and mean jury awards for products liability and malpractice cases
rose sharply from 1960 to 1984. The median doubled and the increase in the mean
varied from 200% to 1000%. This sharply contrasts with the data for automobile
personal injury cases. In both Cook and San Francisco Counties, the auto personal
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cases do involve relatively higher stakes. On the basis of this fact, it
can be argued that they are far more likely to involve more tenacious
and protracted bargaining and higher frequency of trial. The preliminary data appears to support this hypothesis.
Although products liability and malpractice account for merely
six hundred sixty of the 5,298 cases in the population (12%), they
account for 27.2% of the total trial activity. 10 6 Thus, a product liability case was roughly five times more likely to reach trial than an
automobile injury case, and almost three times more likely to reach
trial than a contract or personal injury case.
C. Summary of Data
The data establishes that mediation is the principal docket
event associated with the settlement of civil cases. Since most civil
cases settle prior to trial, it is not likely that mediation caused the
settlement of a substantial number of cases that otherwise would not
have settled. The evaluation of Wayne County's mediation program
turns on whether the program currently provides or promises benefits that justify the time and resources necessary for its existence.
The mediation process cannot be evaluated merely on the basis of
the number of cases that accept the result reached by a mediation
panel. Rather, the mediation process serves a number of purposes,
including: (i) screening the docket for abandoned cases and cases
not properly filed in the circuit court; (ii) triggering the decision to
initiate and/or complete settlement discussions prior to mediation;
and (iii) providing an independent dollar valuation that is frequently
acceptable to the parties or at least is an influence on the settlement
amount ultimately negotiated. The number of dispositions achieved
during the mediation process, as reflected by the acceptance of the
mediators' valuation of a case, is merely one0 measurement
of the
7
impact of mediation on the caseflow process.'
Mediation appears to have a variable impact that depends, in
part, on case type and/or size of stake. The "mediation game" has a
dual dynamic-one set of rules applies to the majority of the early
mediated and relatively smaller cases, and a second set of bargaining rules or behavior patterns applicable to the so called "serious
cases."
injury median was less than $40,000. The median for product liability and malpractice exceeded $150,000. It should be noted, however, that the Rand data was
drawn from a limited number ofjurisdictions.
106. The trial statistic does not indicate whether the cases were tried to completion. It merely indicates that three hundred eleven cases reached the point when
trial was commenced, from the perspective of the trial judge.
107. Significantly, two-thirds of the attorneys responding to Shuart's survey believed that mediation valuations are "generally reasonable." Settling Cases in Detroit,
supra note 4, at 320.
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Notwithstanding this variation, mediation is a trigger of case
dispositions irrespective of case type and size of stake. Although the
product liability, malpractice, and general civil case types have a
docket life significantly greater than other case types, they nevertheless display a fairly similar disposition pattern in relationship to mediation. This pattern suggests that participants are using the
mediation process to settle or otherwise dispose of civil cases
notwithstanding variance in case type.
Most significant for purposes of this Article is the "range finding" function of mediation. Shuart found that the mediation dollar
valuation had a continuous impact when the mediation result was
initially rejected by one or more parties. "[N]o fewer than ten percent of the cases which rejected mediation settled within forty days
of the mediation hearing."' 0 8 In confronting the dilemma of estimating the impact of mediation as compared with that of the settlement conference, Shuart assumed that any settlement achieved
prior to the midpoint between the two events was more related to
mediation than the settlement conference. 1 9 In addition, Shuart
found that 25% of the cases subsequently settled for amounts within
10% of the mediation valuation, and another 10% of the cases settled for an amount within 25% of the mediation valuation. Cultural
anthropologists have found that the negotiation process involves
common features across cultures, including finding a viable range of
value within which effective bargaining can occur." 0 The effectiveness of mediation is directly linked to its ability to provide rationally
based, viable dollar ranges to the litigants.
As discussed subsequently, the range finding function that is so
critical to the negotiations process is better conducted by persons
other than the judges who preside over the actual cases in
controversy.
V.

A.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE DATA

Civil Litigation:An Investment Decision

The previously discussed graphics do not explain why settlement occurs in close relationship to the mediation event. A theory,
or model, of case and attorney behavior provides a partial explanation. Although several models of civil litigation have received some
108. Id. at 315-16.
109. Shuart states: "Typically, the shortest period between a mediation hearing
and a settlement conference is ninety days. Therefore, a settlement before the midway point can reasonably be attributed to the past event rather than the impending
future event." Id. at 316 n. 12. Shuart did not distinguish between early mediation
and later mediation cases. Her assumption seems arbitrary and simplistic when
bargaining behavior is considered.
110. See Gulliver, Negotiations as a Mode of Dispute Settlement. Towards a General
Model, 7 LAw & Soc. REV. 667, 684-87 (1973).
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attention in legal journals, the interactive model developed, in part,
through the work of the CLRP is useful in explaining litigant investment decisions and their relationship to the mediation event."'
The CLRP model treats events as surrogates for the effect of attorney interaction. Events in the life of a civil case, whether a pretrial
conference or a motion for summary judgment, provide opportunities for and reflect attorney/client strategic decision making.
Mediation is distinct from attorney initiated events in that it is
not a by-product of the stimulus response pattern associated with
litigant maneuvering. The issue is not whether to negotiate or bargain. Rather, mediation is an anticipated index point in the civil
case processing pathway, requiring that each attorney prepare and
evaluate her case in relation to it. The interjection of the mediation
event into the civil case processing path, therefore, causes an adaptive alteration in the strategic behavior of attorneys."12 From this
perspective, mediation induces case dispositions by requiring case
preparation and evaluation and strategic decision making substantially prior to a possible trial date.
The foregoing theory of the influence of mediation on attorney
behavior suggests the ironic proposition that mediation, in some
cases, may cause attorneys to refrain from raising the issue of settlement until mediation has been completed. Anecdotal evidence
gleaned from discussions with participant attorneys supports this
hypothesis. The results of informal interviews conducted with more
than twenty attorneys who regularly mediate cases suggest that
when the exposure of the defendants is substantial, as measured by
potential verdict size, defense attorneys are frequently choosing to
avoid settlement discussions prior to the mediation hearing. Rather
than initiate settlement discussions prior to mediation and risk being confronted with dollar amounts already placed on the "table,"
defense counsel may be opting to achieve the best possible mediation result and then "bargain downward."
If this negotiation behavior occurs more frequently in cases that
are perceived to involve higher stakes, then ironically the mediation
program, by scheduling the so called serious cases for mediation
later in time, discourages early settlement discussion, and thereby
arguably reinforces the delayed disposition of a segment of the "serious" cases. Conversely, mediation may encourage defense counsel to attempt to accomplish an early settlement when the perceived
possible impact of mediation is negative in that it poses the potential
of inflating settlement discussion.1
S111.See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 13-31 and accompanying text.
113. This phenomena occurs when a sufficient, but less than optimal, offer has
been made. The risk of a bad mediation encourages acceptance of the offer. Lind
and Shapard, after reviewing arbitration as practiced in three federal courts, noted
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These observations are consistent with the perspective that civil
litigation involves an interactive system providing a framework of
strategic choices for litigants. From this perspective, it is to be anticipated that the participants within the system will mold and use
reforms to effectuate their aims. This process of adaptation may
limit the effectiveness of the reforms.'1 4 Engel and Steele affirm this
feature of the civil justice system in stating: "A particular desired
state of affairs cannot be created simply by selecting attractive procedures or structures from other settings or from one's own imagination with the expectation that they will function automatically in
the desired manner." ' 1 5
The CLRP model of attorney behavior also provides a partial
explanation of case behaviors and disposition patterns in relationship to mediation for cases that terminate prior to mediation. Mediation affects case disposition not simply because it is a mandatory
event requiring that attorneys evaluate their cases and consider settlement. Rather, the content and result of the event also have an
impact on the observed disposition patterns. Investment-based negotiations strategy, combined with the pressure created by mediation to evaluate a case, result in settlements and other dispositions
in the nonmediated category.
Shuart found that a segment of the not mediated category
opted to settle and thereby avoid payment of the mediation fee.' 1 6
The CLRP model suggests an enlarged view of this phenomenon.
The decision to settle a case reflects an evaluation of the risks and
benefits associated with the content of the mediation process. From
this perspective, litigants make strategic choices regarding not only
the direct economic costs associated with mediation, but also the
indirect costs of participation in the mediation process. Indirect
costs consist of the potential impact that mediation may have on the
bargaining pattern in each case subsequent to the mediation evaluathat in two of the three courts, arbitration resulted in more rapid dispositions, primarily of cases that did not reach arbitration. LIND & SHAPARD, supra note 44, at 7677.
114. See Luskin, Building a Theory of Case Processing Time, 62 JUDICATURE 115, 126
(1978). Luskin states:
For example, a decision to reduce the length of adjournments that, according to a simulation, should result in shorter case processing time may
not do so if there are participants who prefer longer case processing times
and who find ways to adapt the system to their own goals. Over time, the
average length of adjournment might decrease, but the number of adjournments might rise.
Id. Luskin suggests that some participants have an interest in longer case processing times.
115. See Engel & Steele, supra note 67, at 333.
116. Settling Cases in Detroit,supra note 4, at 313. The Mediation Tribunal Association collects a fee of $75.00 per party for each mediated case. See MICH. CT. R.
2.403(H)(i) (West 1985); MicH. WAYNE CouNTY CIR. CT. R. 403.8.
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tion.1 7 The predicted outcome of the mediation event, as perceived by each attorney, becomes an element influencing the
decision to either mediate a case or forego mediation through settlement. Therefore, the decision to avoid mediation may involve a
constellation of factors, including cost, attorney time, and the potential gain or diminution of bargaining strength that may result
from mediation.
Once the mediation dollar valuation of a case has been rendered, a new normative standard (clothed in objectivity) is
presented that, in many cases, will provide a focal point for negotiations. From this perspective, avoidance of mediation reflects an assessment of the risk of a "bad" mediation weighed against the
possible gain to be achieved through mediation. The content of the
mediation process, as defined by its perceived potential impact on
and clients' decisions to
the negotiation process, affects 1attorneys'
8
settle cases prior to mediation.'
The advisability of adopting mediation as a mechanism to reduce congestion, fight delay, and to expedite civil case processing is
contingent on the source of congestion and delay. There is no empirical support for the proposition that mediation causes cases to
settle that otherwise would have proceeded to trial. Moreover, the
literature and the previously discussed data strongly suggest that
the primary impact of mediation/arbitration programs is on the segment of cases that leave the docket prior to the mediation or arbitration hearing. Thus, these programs cannot find justification
principally as a remedy for, or prevention against, delay in the
courts. Such justification assumes that the source of delay is that
segment of cases that setde prior to court-annexed mediation or arbitration. This assumption seems quite dubious.
The Third Judicial Circuit's experience is instructive. It is
doubtful that mediation cleared up the backlog of delayed civil cases
when it was reinstituted in late 1979. The perception that mediation
was somehow instrumental in attacking the backlog of civil cases (a
perception that is apparently widely shared by many persons associated with the mediation program), is probably attributable to the
initial infusion that the system received when numerous cases, which
117. Indeed, mediation may pose an impediment to settlement negotiations.
Participant attorneys report that "bad" mediation poses obstacles to settlement negotiations in that it causes unduly small or inflated expectations. Settling Cases in
Detroit, supra note 4, at 320.

118. Engel and Steele discussed the operation of feedback loops in civil litigation. As civil cases progress through the five stages postulated by them, they are
influenced not only by this temporal movement but also by nonsequential effects.
These nonsequential effects are manifested through feedback loops. Engel &
Steele, supra note 67, at 317-32.
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were carried on the active civil docket, were noticed for mediation
and subsequently dismissed as settled or abandoned.
The "not mediated" category contains cases that were abandoned prior to transmission of a mediation notice and cases in
which the relative merits, as perceived by the participants, required
that mediation be avoided. Mediation is the first regularly scheduled, and therefore first anticipated, docket event requiring the appearance of attorneys. For some cases, it is the first instance in
which one or more of the attorneys rigorously evaluates the merits
of the positions taken in the pleadings. Some attorneys are not
making a systematic analysis of their cases until an external event
requires it. 1 9 Thus, when the mediation program was first reinstituted, it is likely that the civil docket experienced surges of dispositions related to this aspect of mediation.
Mediation in the Third Judicial Circuit, however, has not been a
prophylactic against the development of a delayed civil docket and
the problem of delayed civil cases. After several years of uninterrupted mediation activity, the court in 1986 experienced somewhat
of a crisis. Civil trials were regularly being conducted in the fortieth
month. 2 ' The median disposition time for all civil cases in the data
set is currently not much different from median disposition time observed by Church.' 2 ' The consistency of the median time to trial
statistic over several years suggests a system at equilibrium, albeit a
system that has incorporated and adapted mandatory mediation.
Although mandatory mediation in the Third Judicial Circuit has
not met some of the goals posited for it, the current benefits and the
promise of future benefits may justify the program. The wide acceptance of mediation by the bar and its usage as a trigger of case
dispositions establishes mediation related events as a key link in the
settlement/negotiation process. The data suggests that mandatory
mediation has routinized the interactive negotiations process in relationship to regularly scheduled, and therefore predictable, docket
119. See Brazil, Kahn, Newman & Gold, Early Neutral Evaluation: An Experimental
Effort to Expedite Dispute Resolution, 69 JUDICATURE 279, 279-80 (1986).
120. Unpublished court documents and discussions with administrative personnel indicate that the median time to trial for negligence and general civil cases was
39.8 and 40.5 months, respectively.
121. SeeJUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 4, at 11-13. The authors found a "median
tort disposition time" of seven hundred eighty-eight days and a "median time to
trial" of 1,231 days. "Median tort disposition time" is the median length of time
from commencement of an action to the entry of an order closing it. "Time to
trial" is the period from commencement of an action to the commencement of a
jury trial. By 1983 the trial statistic was 1,127 days, and the median time to disposition was seven hundred twenty-one days. See IMPLEMENTING DELAY REDUCTION,
supra note 4, at 8-9. In 1986, employees charged with the administration of the
court found that jury trials were regularly being conducted in the thirty-seventh to
thirty-ninth months.
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events.12 2 Interpretation of the data, which is admittedly value
laden, suggests that mandatory mediation, as measured by its future
promise, provides a direction toward more cost effective civil case
processing simply by providing a reliable vehicle and format for attorney negotiations.
The proposition that mediation causes cases that were actually
mediated to settle at an earlier point in time currently lacks empirical support. Nevertheless, the centrality of the mediation process in
the settlement dynamic within the Third Judicial Circuit means that
mediation can ultimately be used to expedite the settlement process.
The data from this study and Shuart's work unequivocally establish
that the participant attorneys are making creative use of mediation.
Thus, the case analysis, feedback, and range finding features of mediation can be used to facilitate substantive discussion and negotiation for a large segment of civil cases.
The possible future benefits of mediation are directly related to
cross-cultural aspects of negotiations and strong evidence of participant (attorney) satisfaction in relationship to the mediation program. Negotiation involves a successive process of disagreement
and finding agreement, resulting in further definition. At the
threshold of bargaining, the parties must find a range of possible
agreement within which to identify further difference.'
For example, in a personal injury case in which the plaintiff attorney's evaluation of her case is $1 million and the defense attorney's assessment
of plaintiff's case is one thousand dollars, productive bargaining is
not possible. In most civil cases, the attorneys eventually reach a
mutually agreed upon (although perhaps not explicit) understanding that the case actually fits within a dollar range. Once a range
develops, the disagreement-agreement cycle can begin anew until
some narrowing of the bargaining range has been achieved.
122. Attorney negotiations basically involve a "norm-centered" model of dispute negotiations when the invocation and elaboration of norms prevail. See Eisenberg, supra note 22, at 639. Mediation provides a neutral forum for negotiation and
a standard or norm as expressed by the valuation amount. Thus, litigants are not
dependent on whether they are fortunate in drawing ajudge that is skilled in fostering settlement. It is also free of the possibility that a judge will engage in inappropriate conduct promoting settlement. This routinization of the bargaining process
fits comfortably with Brazil's conclusions that attorneys want crisp analysis from
judges in pretrial or settlement procedures. Brazil indicated that attorneys want a
judge who "is active rather than passive; analytical rather than emotional or coercive; learns the facts and law involved in the dispute... [and] offers explicit assessments of parties' positions and specific suggestions for ways to reach solutions."
Brazil, SettlingCivil Cases: What Lawyers Want FromJudges,23JUDGEJ. 14, 16 (Summer
1984).
123. See Gulliver, supra note 110, at 684-85; H. Ross, SETrLED OUT or COURT,
THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMs ADJUSTMENT 144 (2d ed. 1980). Under
normal circumstances, an acceptable range of value is a necessary precondition to a
negotiated settlement.
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Shuart found substantial satisfaction with the Wayne County
mediation process. 1 24 Indeed, participant satisfaction can be inferred from the data and graphics presented in Part IV. Dispositions would not cluster in relationship to mediation related events if
attorneys and participants were not actively using the process to settle or otherwise conclude their cases.
Shuart's findings fit comfortably within Brazil's work in identifying what attorneys want from judges in pretrial or settlement conferences and the mediation process as measured by what it delivers.
Attorneys want analysis of their cases. Brazil surveyed almost 1,900
litigators, and his research identified the judicial techniques that
trial attorneys viewed as most helpful in achieving settlement. The
respondents overwhelmingly viewed judicial intervention as helpful.
Significantly, trial attorneys want analytical evaluation
rather than
12 5
formulas or expressions of personal opinion.
Mediation provides an analytical evaluation from a tripartite
panel whose members have no perceived interest in the outcome of
the cases before them. Apparently, for most cases, an analytical
evaluation is the end result. 1 26 The evaluation includes a dollar valuation of each case. The dollar valuation has proven significant.
The graphics presented in Part IV of this Article, and the data developed by Shuart regarding the relationship of the amount of the mediation valuation to the dollar amount of actual settlements,
demonstrate that the dollar valuation has a significant impact on the
124. Shuart evaluated five areas: (1) hearing format; (2) case evaluation as a settlement technique; (3) role of the penalty provision; (4) costs; and (5) redundancy
of multiple settlement devices. Ninety percent of the respondents believed that
information conveyed through the process was sufficient for valuation purposes.
Settling Cases in Detroit, supra note 4, at 318-19. "[O]nly four of the 120 attorneys
surveyed stated that some cases are too complex for this type of abbreviated proceeding." Id. at 320. Seventy-five percent believed that useful disclosure occurred,
and two-thirds agreed that valuations were reasonable. Id.
The critical issue concerning improvements in the system was the strength of
the mediation panels. Forty-seven percent urged that changes be made in the mediator selection process. Id. at 319.

125. W. BRAZIL, SETTLING CIVIL Surrs: LITIGATORS' VIEWS ABOUT APPROPRIATE
ROLES AND EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUES FOR FEDERAL JUDGES (ABAJudicial Admin. Div.
1985).
126. The mediation hearing and the mediator evaluation involve not only an
evaluation of the law and factual circumstances of each case, but also certain intangibles, including the trial ability of counsel and the probable difficulty in explaining the case to the finder of fact. Based on informal interviews of mediators,
there was sharp debate on the issue of whether mediators should actively consider
trial counsel capability as a factor.
Future studies must examine the composition of mediation panels with respect
to issues such as potential gender and race bias. Assuming that mediator perceptions of the aforementioned intangibles are determinants of mediation outcome, an
imbalance in the make-up of panels quite likely yields "second class" justice for
some attorneys and litigants.
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negotiation process. Attorneys are using the mediation event as a
"range finding" mechanism.
The wide acceptance of the program provides the court and
mediation tribunal with new means of affecting bargaining and the
timing of civil case dispositions. Mediation induces case dispositions by providing both a prod and an incentive to evaluate and prepare a case for negotiation. The difference between prodding a case
toward disposition through the threat of possible imposition of
sanctions and an approach based on incentives is more than semantical. Indeed, the one-sided emphasis on active, forceful case management and judicial control may reflect the difference between a
"mechanistic" versus a "holistic" approach to civil justice and civil
case management.
B.

Toward a New Paradigm

The central tenets of the "mechanistic paradigm" in case management theory and practice are now widely proclaimed in the professional journals and have been incorporated into the operation of
many trial courts. 1 2 7 This paradigm depicts civil cases as objects to
be classified and shepherded from their commencement to their removal from the active docket.1 28 The people associated with each
case, including the clients and particularly the attorneys, are individuals who must be kept "on their toes." 1 29 Critical to modem case
management theory is the proposition that the court must require
that "lawyers must complete their work in a timely fashion." '
127. The mechanistic paradigm holds that civil cases can be processed expeditiously if courts watch their cases closely and control the development of cases toward trial by establishing deadlines for case preparation. "The degree of control is
closely associated with the time required for each stage of a case, which also varies
greatly among courts." Flanders, supra note 7, at 17.
128. Judicial control therefore involves the strictly management function of
maintaining pressure toward disposition. See SOLOMON, supra note 5, at 4-5.
129. The literature is replete with assertions that maintaining a sense of urgency
among attorney participants is critical to proper and expeditious case management.
See Flanders, Modeling-Court Delay, 2 L. & POL'Y 305, 315 (1980). Flanders states:
To summarize, the outlines of effective management are these. For every
case, civil or criminal, someone in the court has a sustained responsibility
to assure that it moves expeditiously to completion. There is always a
scheduled next date by which certain specified tasks are to be completed,
and that next date is always quite short in relation to what the lawyers
think is desirable or possible . . . . [Tihe schedule is established and
enforced.
Id. See also Connolly & Planet, supra note 7, at 57 (scheduling that requires "counsel
to look at their file about every two weeks since that period is about their maximum
sense of urgency"); Friesen, supra note 6, at 4-7 (keeping attorneys on their toes).
But see NIMMER, supra note 3, at 5 ("In the absence of [a theoretical framework] ... ,
reform planning proceeds under traditional or intuitive assumptions about behavior modification.").
130. Flanders, supra note 7, at 17.
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Historically speaking, the development of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure altered the process of civil litigation and placed attorneys more in control of individual cases. Discovery and the timing of discovery were placed almost completely in the hands of the
litigants. This trend was balanced by the adoption of procedures
that provided the judiciary with an ability to manage civil cases.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 was adopted for the purpose
of civil case management. 3 1 The Wayne County Circuit Court's experience with pretrial conferences greatly influenced the promulgators of the federal civil procedure rules.' 3 2 It was believed that
the pretrial procedures would aid in removing extraneous disputes
from the docket and expedite trial.' 33 The conventional wisdom developed that "inexorable progress" toward trial was the most effective "stimulant of fair settlements," and that the pretrial procedures
facilitated this end. In addition, although Rule 16 did not expressly
1 34
refer to settlement, it came into wide usage as a settlement tool.
Rule 16, as amended in 1983, requires the entry of a pretrial
scheduling order. The amendments represent an attempt to require
federal trial judges to personally intervene in and thereby manage
civil cases.13 5 The current version of Rule 16 expressly mentions
facilitating settlement as an aim,
and also includes a provision ex13 6
pressly authorizing sanctions.
Several studies indicate that mandatory pretrial conferences do
not shorten disposition time nor produce more frequent settlements, and are generally an inefficient use ofjudicial time.' 3 7 There
131.

See 6

C. WRIGHT

& A.

MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CIVIL

§ 1521 (2d ed. 1990).
132. Id. § 1521.
133. Id. § 1522.
134. Id.
135. The extensive amendments to Rule 16 in 1983 made judicial case management an express goal. The new rule requires the convening of a pretrial conference and entry of a pretrial order, but allows the trial judge to exclude certain cases
from unnecessary pretrial conferences. The promulgators of the amendments
heavily relied upon Flanders when they stated:
Empirical studies reveal that when a trial judge intervenes personally at an
early stage to assume judicial control over a case and to schedule dates for
completion by the parties of the principal pretrial steps, the case is disposed of by settlement or trial more efficiently and with less cost and delay
than when the parties are left to their own devices.
Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 33, at 207 (citation omitted).
136. Prior to the 1983 amendments, the power to impose sanctions was viewed
as an inherent power of the court. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 131, § 1531;
Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 33, at 213.
137. See ROSENBERG, supra note 38, at 17-18. See also J. RYAN, A. ASHMAN, B.
SALES & S. DUBOW, AMERICAN TRIAL JUDGES 177-91 (1980) (the authors found that
over 75% of the judges studied intervened in some manner, with 10% intervening
aggressively. Judges were more likely to intervene when they had a relatively high
self perception of competence in settling cases and when attorneys were relatively
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is also support for the proposition that more "activist" judges who

expend relatively larger amounts of time encouraging settlement
dispose of fewer cases than less "activist" judges."' Hence, some
theorists advocate that removal ofjudges from the management and
settlement process and the associated savings in judicial time are
worthwhile goals.
The express language of Rule 16 acknowledges that pretrial
conferences are an inefficient use of judicial time in many cases.
Subsection 16(b) provides that the court shall enter scheduling or-

ders in all cases "[e]xcept in categories of actions exempted by district court rule as inappropriate .. ",l The Rule also allows the
district court to delegate the entry of pretrial orders to a magistrate.14 Rule 16 thereby attempts to strike a flexible balance between the benefits ofjudicial intervention and the inefficiency of too

much intervention.'

Rule 16 also envisions that the trial judge will

play a helpful (but undefined) role in facilitating the settlement pro-

cess.' 4 2 This joinder of the settlement function with early, forceful

less skilled); Wall & SchillerJudicialInvolvement in Pre-TrialSettlement: A Judge is Not a
Bump on a Log, 6 AM.J. TRiL, ADvoc. 27, 35-37 (1982) (Wall & Schiller found that

the judges studied participated significantly in 34% of the settlement proceedings.
Lawyers perceived that a substantial number of the judicial techniques which were
frequently used were unethical.).
138. Flanders, supra note 7, at 37-39.
139. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b). See Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 33, at 207
(mandatory scheduling orders represent "a degree of judicial involvement that is
not warranted in many cases"). Rule 16 permits exemption of certain categories of
cases in which the burdens of scheduling orders exceed the administrative efficiencies that would be gained.
140. The rule expresses a preference for judicial involvement but permits delegation to a magistrate. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b).
141. It is believed that the time lost in a strictly management function will be
offset by a net savings in time to disposition. As stated by Miller:
But, we honestly believe that time expended in scheduling and management will be offset by time economies you will experience later on in these
cases.
Once again, we lack empiric evidence on the subject, but the available
data indicate that management conducted early in the action will produce
efficiencies later in the proceedings. ... The hope is that by robbing Peter
to pay Paul in terms of allocating time, there will be a net savings for all
concerned.
Miller, The August 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Promoting
Effective Case Management and Lawyer Responsibility, 1984 FED. JUD. CENTER 29.

142. Regarding the settlement process, the Advisory Committee comments acknowledge the reality of settlement but provide little direction. In regard to Rule
16(c)(7), the Advisory Committee states:
Clause (7) explicitly recognizes that it has become commonplace to discuss settlement at pretrial conferences. Since it obviously eases crowded
court dockets and results in savings to the litigants and the judicial system,
settlement should be facilitated at as early a stage of the litigation as possible. Although it is not the purpose of Rule 16(c)(7) to impose settlement
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(but removed) case management is problematic.
The conception of the trial judge embodied in Rule 16 appears
eclectic and contradictory. With regard to the settlement process,
the rule provides little guidance. Brazil's data indicates that attorneys want analytical input and an analytical evaluation of their cases
from judges. How can judges be removed from involvement in the
case management and settlement process yet allocate the time essential to a careful, analytical appraisal of the cases before them?
Additional questions are raised by literature, which suggest that:
judges may not make good mediators; 4 ' three mediators obtain
better results than one mediator;' 4 4 the mediation results appear to
track with mediator experience. 145 Absent a substantial allocation
of time devoted to settlement, it is difficult to understand how it is
that judges are to develop the experience requisite to serving capably as case evaluators and mediators. A probable result is that settlement efforts under Rule 16 in many instances will involve "a mere
exchange of legalistic contentions without any real analysis of the
particular case." 146
It should also be kept in mind that judges are not necessarily
subject matter experts. Indeed, federal judges sitting in diversity
may possess a very narrow understanding of the substantive state
law governing contract, property, and various tort actions. Perhaps
judges ought to be insulated from a broad role in the settlement
negotiations on unwilling litigants, it is believed that providing a neutralforum
for discussing the subject mightfoster it.
Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 33, at 210 (emphasis added). See also Miller,
supra note 141, at 26. Miller, the Reporter for the Rules Committee, indicated that
the committee was not able to formulate a thorough rule because of the controversy as to the proper role of the judge in settlement negotiations.
143. Eckhoff, The Mediator, the Judge and the Administrator in Conflict Resolution, 10
ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 148, 161-66 (1967). Eckhoff suggests that the demands ofjudging and a perceived lack of neutrality may make it difficult for a judge effectively to
mediate civil cases.
144. Weller, Commentary on "An Evaluation of Alternatives to Adjudication," 7 JusT.
Sys. J. 445 (1982). Weller compares the results of compulsory arbitration programs in California and Pennsylvania and concludes that mediation hearings conducted by panels of three mediators resulted in fewer appeals than those conducted
by individual mediators.
145. See Pearson, Thoenne & Vanderkooi, The Decision to Mediate: Profiles of Individuals Who Accept and Reject the Opportunity to Mediate Contested Child Custody and Visitation Issues, 6J. DIVORCE 1 (Fall 1982). This finding refers to traditional mediation
practices and not a case evaluation model. Nevertheless, the experience of the
mediators is one variable that probably correlates with acceptance or rejection of a
mediation valuation in Wayne County, Michigan. The greater the perceived/actual
experience and subject matter expertise, the more likely the mediation result will
form a bargaining norm or standard, thereby influencing negotiations. This view is
widely held within the Wayne County Mediation Tribunal Association.
146. See Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 33.
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process and procedures developed that aim exclusively at facilitating settlement.
The pretrial procedure envisioned by Rule 16 also has been
subject to substantial criticism on other grounds. Judicial pretrials
offer reduced procedural safeguards; decisions made in chambers
may not be subject to review until a final decision on the merits has
been rendered. And there is little evidence to support the proposition that increased
pretrial activity settles cases more cheaply or
47
more quickly.'
The mediation data suggest that mandatory mediation may provide a worthy alternative to pretrial conferences in a broad range of
cases.' 48 The structure of the mediation program incorporates advantages that are not offered by Rule 16. The tripartite panel offers
both the plaintiff and defendant the promise that the case appraisal
process will include consideration of each advocate's position. The
tripartite panel also operates completely free of direct judicial involvement. Thus, the program does not involve a reallocation of
judicial energy from adjudicatory functions to case management or
settlement related activity.
The past decade of experience with court-annexed mediation
suggests a prescription for change in the content of procedural rules
and the manner in which procedural rules are perceived. The civil
justice system is a participatory, interactive system in which individuals and groups operate interdependently, and settled norms govern much of individual and group behavior. Docket management
initiatives aimed solely at pushing attorneys to resolve cases is insufficient. A more strategic and .two-sided (holistic) approach would
aim at facilitating the development of commonly understood and
accepted standards and the ndgotiations of the actors within the system. Reform generally does not occur as a result of the engrafting
of the "grand idea" onto an existing process.' 4 9 Rather, change occurs when "a reform creates incentives or alters the environment
147. Resnik, supra note 35, at 8-11.
148. Cases that settle prior to mediation/arbitration provide obvious savings for
the litigants, if not the court system. In these cases, no judicial time is expended.
Also, obvious time savings are reaped with respect to cases in which mediation valuations are accepted during the mediation or shortly thereafter. More research
needs to be directed at the stakes/complexity issue in order to determine the relationship, if any, between the size of stake and case complexity, and the impact of
mediation on the various strata of tort and other litigation.
149. The mediation program is a primary example of this phenomenon. Originally, it was believed that mediation would greatly help to clear a congested docket
and would provide a prophylactic against delay. After a short period of claimed
success in the early 1970's, the program fell into disuse. The reconstituted program was greatly improved by this early failure. Notwithstanding the current success of the program, the data and interviews suggest that mediation has affected the
civil case docket in an unanticipated manner. No one foresaw that attorneys would
begin to utilize mediation as creatively as current practice suggests.

572

UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:531

sufficiently to induce altered behavior." 5 ° Mediation may provide
such incentive when it demonstrably facilitates the settlement process. Given this view of the civil justice system, rule makers might
better focus on drafting rules that incorporate incentives that can be
maximized by proper preparation of civil cases. These new rules
would seek to encourage prompt case preparation by offering incentives, which in turn yield tactical advantages. The mediation rule in
effect in the Third Judicial Circuit is an example of this approach to
rule making.
Rule 16 envisions that the provision of a neutral forum within
which to discuss settlement is beneficial. 5 ' The rule, however, falls
short of the kind of case appraisal and attorney feedback truly
needed to facilitate case settlement. Rule 16 was amended to encourage the early and continuous judicial management of civil cases
throughout all of the district courts.1 52 Notwithstanding this intent,
relegating court-initiated settlement efforts exclusively to the pretrial conference means that the quantity and quality of those efforts,
and the end result in terms of the quality of case appraisal, will vary
with the skill, personality, and work style of each federal trial
judge. 5 3 Moreover, the judge in a particular case is not necessarily
the person most likely to be viewed by participants as qualified to
provide a neutral and analytical case appraisal. Rule 16 thereby subordinates the facilitation of settlement to a case management paradigm. A more two-sided approach is required if the case settlement
150. NIMMER, supra note 3, at 63.
151. See Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 33, at 210.
152. Miller recognized that judicial settlement and case management practices
vary greatly. Miller states:
There are three significant apprehensions regarding new rule 16. The
first is the same as one articulated with regard to rules 7 and 1 1-if ajudge
is not disposed to manage, will he pay attention to rule 16? Certainly
there are federal judges who do not manage their dockets aggressively;
they have various reasons for this attitude, which by and large reflect their
own style or conception ofjudging. But since younger judges seem more
in tune with the need for management, the number of reluctant judges is
dwindling as new judges also are heavily encouraged in this direction by
the Federal Judicial Center . . . . [T]here are judges who probably will
reject the orientation of rule 16, but they should be relatively few in
number.
Miller, supra note 14 1, at 28.
153. Freeing settlement from the "firm judicial control" mind set requires that
rules governing court-initiated settlement efforts take into account the interactive
process engaged in by attorneys as they seek to resolve civil cases through settlement, and the feedback loops associated with the acceptance and use of events such
as mandatory mediation. Settlement should be a declared and formal part of the
litigation game. This approach envisions changes in the preparation of civil cases
by attorneys based on their desire to use the mediation event to their best advantage, rather than case preparation principally in anticipation of the close of discovery, the imminence of trial, or the wrath of the court.
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process is to be taken seriously.1
An anecdote that was reported during one of the informal attorney interviews provides an example of the benefit of a two-sided
approach to procedural rules. The mediation program in the Third
Judicial Circuit, as a matter of custom, allows the parties to a civil
action to stipulate to a "special mediation" in lieu of the normal
mediation procedure required by Michigan Court Rule 2.403.'-1
Under this rule, the attorneys can stipulate to the selection of a special mediation panel. The plaintiff attorney chooses the plaintiff mediator and the defendant chooses the defense mediator.
Customarily, the two mediators selected by the plaintiff and defendant then select a neutral mediator. The special mediation rule was
developed in order to allow attorneys in complex cases to select
panels they believed most capable of facilitating a settlement. In
one case involving an automobile product liability/design defect
claim and a road design claim, the plaintiff's attorney allowed the
defense attorney to select both the defense mediator and the neutral
mediator. This approach was intended to result in a panel that
would be receptive to the defendant's arguments. Subsequent to
the mediation, the plaintiff's attorney was able to negotiate a settle56
ment that was almost 50% greater than the mediation result.'
This example reflects a creative use of the mediation process to influence and persuade an adversary as to the appropriate range of
value in a specific case.
The two-sided approach advocated herein is not based on the
perspective that mediation by itself provides a basis for system-wide
change in civil justice practice and procedure. Rather, it proceeds
from the standpoint that mediation is a helpful, necessary complement to existing procedural approaches. In the context of the Third
Judicial Circuit, mediation should be a significant element of any
strategy aimed at delayed cases. For example, for a later mediated
case, movement of the mediation event to a point earlier in time
could serve to induce attorneys to prepare cases to capitalize on the
mediation event.'-" Another example might be the development of

154. MicH. CT. R. 2.403(B)(1)(a) provides that a case may be submitted to mediation "on written stipulation of the parties." The rule thereby affords the litigants
some latitude in tailoring the mediation procedure to meet the particularized needs
of specific cases.
155. Some attorneys indicated that they do not utilize the special mediation rule
because they do not want their adversary to interpret their desire to use the rule as
an indication that the adversary's case or argument is in any way deserving of special attention. For these attorneys, initiating settlement or suggesting that a special
mediation was appropriate indicated that they were unsure of the strength of their
cases or fearful of their opponents' cases.
156. The mediation against the automobile manufacturer was $750,000. That
defendant settled the case for approximately $1.1 million.
157. This measure appears appropriate because the literature indicates that case
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several docket tracks in which the plaintiff, upon filing, would have
the option to make an election for early mediation and early settlement conference dates.15 8 From this perspective, procedural rules
provide a menu of approaches to civil cases. This menu would focus
the attorneys on prompt preparation and creative processes that facilitate negotiated solutions. This notion, at least in part, underpins
the current approach to modern rules governing discovery.
Nothing stated here should be construed to mean that current
pretrial practices and judicial management approaches are without
value. Rather, the aim of this discussion is to indicate that these
practices merely reflect a part of the picture. Further reform is necessary to achieve efficient and prompt administration of the civil justice system in urban trial courts.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Neither the results of this study nor the literature definitively
explain why mediation has an impact on settlement negotiations.
Perhaps the simple reason is that the manner in which mediation is
scheduled, combined with the comprehensive review and evaluation
of a case required by mediation, have caused attorneys to use the
mediation event as a focus for settlement negotiations.
The nominal costs and complete lack of judicial time involved
in the Wayne County, Michigan, approach to mediation make it a
program worthy of increased study and consideration by the bench
and bar. This program avoids many of the potential problems associated with present case management functions served by the judiciary. Mediation does not raise the specter of heavy-handed judges
coercing attorneys and litigants into settlements, or making unreviewable personal evaluations or judgments about a case that may
affect the conduct of a trial.
It appears clear that mandatory mediation and arbitration programs are not a cure-all. Court administrators, attorneys, judges,
law makers and others concerned with the delay, costs, and other
type is not a significant variable in explaining delay. See Flanders, supra note 7.

Flanders indicates that relatively fast courts terminate all types of civil cases in a
relatively fast manner. In addition, case type is not a sufficiently precise variable

because any case type may contain relatively complex and difficult cases requiring
additional hours of judicial time. Id. at 72-73. In the mediation study, products
liability and malpractice case types accounted for an inordinate percentage of the
trial activity. It cannot be argued, however, that those case types inherently require
twenty-seven months for discovery and mediation.
158. With respect to this suggestion, it can be argued that such election would
be fruitless in a system in which trials are routinely conducted in the thirty-sixth
month or later. However, the large number of settlements achieved at or near the
mediation hearing suggest that the "courthouse steps" settlement phenomenon
may not play a substantial role in mediated cases. This issue should be tested by
examining mediated high-stake cases against a control group of nonmediated cases.
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burdens associated with litigation cannot rely on these programs as
remedies that can be uniformly applied in all circumstances. Consideration of mandatory mediation must include a careful assessment of the goals sought to be achieved. Mediation can
substantially expedite the resolution of lower tier civil lawsuits involving money damages. The overwhelming majority of these cases
are destined to settle or otherwise terminate prior to trial. Mediation can also provide a stimulant and inducement to bona fide negotiation, even for the tier of civil actions involving relatively high
stakes. It appears clear that attorneys welcome the crisp analysis
and range finding that mediation can provide. There is no empirical
evidence, however, that mediation has caused cases to settle that
otherwise would have proceeded to trial.
Undoubtedly, further research needs to be conducted into the
mediation process and its relative impact on various types of civil
cases. Mediator behavior also needs to be explored in order to better understand what types of behavior best facilitate serious bargaining and case settlement. The fruits of such research might provide
the .basis for substantial change in our perception of procedural
rules and the manner in which attorneys are trained. The fruits of
the study discussed in this Article suggest that the advisability of
looking to the trial judge as the main settlement facilitator is
questionable.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix consists of two subparts. Part I is a general
summary of the data collection process. Part II is a description of
the procedures used to identify and eliminate incorrect data.
Part I

-

Methodology

The Third Judicial Circuit Court's computer was the source of
data for the mediation study. A magnetic tape containing biographies for 5,615 civil cases was developed.' This population included all civil cases scheduled for mediation during the period
from January through June, 1984. The tape was derived from the
court's computing system on May 15, 1986.
The magnetic tape contains twenty-seven variables for each
case within the population. These variables include case identification number, filing date, disposition date, mediation amount, disposition type, and case type. The format of the magnetic tape allowed
subpopulations of cases to be isolated and analyzed.
The variables for each case were formatted in a repeating record format on the magnetic tape. 2 The repeating record format allowed each case or any set of cases to be selected and analyzed.
Thus, at any point from filing to disposition, cross-sections that
identified each case on the basis of any of the variables could be
developed. For example, the identity of each case that settled prior
to early mediation could be determined, and this subset of cases
could then be analyzed by case type, number of parties, or number
of partial dispositions.
Frequency tables were initially generated for all original variables. Assessment of the frequency tables resulted in the creation of
new variables. For example, the filing date for each case was subtracted from its disposition date to create a new variable-"dispage." Dispage means the disposition age of the case, as measured
from the time of filing to the date an order was entered that removed the case from the active civil docket.'
The frequency tables also identified a group of cases that appeared to be abnormal, e.g., cases that displayed a negative number
1. A second magnetic tape was generated containing the biographies of approximately 6,300 civil cases that were scheduled for mediation in the first six
months of calendar year 1985. That data set has not been analyzed yet.
2. "Repeating record format" means that each case, as recorded on the magnetic tape, has the same number of lines (records) that are placed in a fixed order.
Each record begins with the identification number of the case to which the record is
related. Each record also contains a record number indicating whether it, for example, is record number 1, record number 6, or record number 9.
3. Although stays resulting from interlocutory appeals or bankruptcy proceedings also remove a case from the active docket, such cases are not closed. To
the degree possible, therefore, such cases were eliminated from the data set.
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for disposition age. These cases were reviewed manually and
recoded with proper dates if they met the original criteria for the
population.
Five thousand four hundred twenty-nine cases remained in the
population after the aforementioned procedures were conducted.
A systems file was created containing 5,429 cases, with sixtyone variables for each case. New frequency tables, multiple crosstabs, bivariates, and standard descriptive statistics were generated.
The creation of new variables and the development of graphics depicting the case processing path further identified groups of cases
that required segregation from the main data set, including: (1)
cases that were removed to the district court because their alleged
damages did not meet the jurisdictional floor of $10,000; and (2)
cases that had disposition dates that were less than or equal to their
mediation notice dates. Both groups of cases are significant in their
relationship to the mediation process, but must be explained
separately.
Removed cases, for purposes of the circuit court's docket, are
dead cases. That is, removal to the district court completely eliminates the circuit court's jurisdiction. From a case management perspective, this termination pathway is as important to the proper
administration of the court as any of the other possible case termination routes. Removal of a case does not, however, resolve the
underlying dispute.
The group of cases containing a disposition date that occurred
prior to the mediation date are significant because they relate to the
"docket cleaning" function of the mediation process. This subset of
cases arguably did not belong within the population of cases studied. Had appropriate orders been entered in these cases, they
would never have been scheduled for mediation. The fact that they
were issued mediation notices indicates that appropriate dispositional orders were not entered. Final orders were entered in these
cases because issuance of the notice of mediation compelled the attorneys to inform the court of their disposition.
In addition to the statistical data, background information pertaining to the history of the mediation process, the structure of the
Mediation Tribunal Association, and the history of the court were
collected through a series of personal interviews with several experienced court managers, county executives, and attorneys.
Part 11-

Data Cleaning

Review of frequency tables raised suspicion as to the reliability
of the disposition date variable in a number of cases. In addition, it
was necessary to determine whether the case type variable in the
court's computer system corresponded with this evaluation's case
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typology. For example, that the case type code "NM" (malpractice)
actually involved a doctor, a health care professional other than a
doctor, or an attorney as a party defendant.
Time of disposition, of course, is a "fuzzy" variable for several
reasons. In many instances, the time recorded in the court's records
and in the court's computer does not represent the point in time
when a case actually settled or otherwise terminated. A review of
the "case prints" 4 demonstrated that attorneys frequently notified
the court several months after a settlement had been consumated.
In order to determine whether the disposition dates, and in
some cases the mediation dates, were accurate, case identification
numbers were generated for all suspect cases. Three hundred fortyseven cases were identified that appeared to have disposition ages of
less than thirteen months. Of this subgroup, one hundred two cases
required an alteration of the disposition date. Four of the cases that
were recorded as terminated were actually open and awaiting trial.
Date variables were used to further identify cases that were
likely to have an incorrect disposition date variable. Two temporary
variables-"latemed" (mediation later than disposition) and
"lateconf" (settlement conference later than disposition)-were
created. Any case in which the mediation or settlement conference
occurred subsequent to a disposition was labeled as suspect. Each
of the suspect cases was checked against its case print. This procedure produced one hundred twenty-two cases with a latemed variable. The disposition dates for one hundred fourteen of these cases
were corrected. Four cases were identified that were not actually
mediated. The mediation date variable for these cases was corrected. In nine cases where the disposition date was corrected, the
case was also removed. Three cases were stayed, and two cases were
open and awaiting trial.
A similar procedure was utilized for every case in which there
was a lateconf variable. One thousand six cases were identified; and
the filing date, mediation date, conference date, and disposition
date for each case was screened. Disposition dates were corrected
in two hundred ninety-four cases. The settlement conference date
was corrected in fifty-four cases. In eighteen of the cases, a media4. A case print is a computer generated docket sheet that documents events
occurring in the life of a civil case. The date of filing, disposition, motions, etc. are
all recorded in a case print. In addition, the format for the entry of data provides
an area within which the clerk or other court employee making an entry can make
additional comments. Such comments are known as "free field comments." Customarily, the court's computer records contain this information, as well as a history
of docket events. Frequently, free field comments will explain why a particular
event code was entered in a case. For example, in cases where an order was entered at the settlement conference, the comments frequently indicated that the
court received notice that a case had settled several months or several days prior to
the settlement conference.
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tion date was entered where there previously was none. In a substantial number of cases, the order disposing of the case was filed
many months after the event which signaled an end to the case.
This time ranged as long as twelve months. Indeed, there were several cases in which the time from dispositive event to entry of the
order was slightly more than twelve months. There were also numerous cases in which the time lag involved five to seven months.
Frequently, the settlement conference consisted of nothing more
than notice to the court that the attorneys would not be appearing
because the case had been resolved.
The cases identified by the lateconf and latemed variables were
removed from the system's file. The cases remaining in the systems
file were assumed to have reliable dates. A 5% sample was drawn
from this group in order to verify this assumption. The sample size
was two hundred cases. Evaluation of these cases confirmed that the
vast majority of the cases in the sample had correct filing, disposition, and mediation dates. Eight cases were identified as having incorrect disposition dates. The disposition date variable for these
cases was recoded. No errors were identified for filing date, mediation date, or settlement conference date. An additional sixty-three
cases were drawn from the batch of cases in which the dates were
presumed to be correct. Manual evaluation of these cases resulted
in four correctiorns of the disposition date variable.
The manual evaluation of the previously described cases revealed that some "disposition types" were suspect. For example,
occasionally a case in the population would have either a divorce
decree or an order restoring a drivers license as the final order closing the case. Since driver restorations and divorce proceedings are
not subject to mediation, no case in the data set could legitimately
be closed on that basis. In addition, stays resulting from interlocutory appeals and from bankruptcy proceedings were frequently associated with incorrect disposition dates.
The case identification number for each case in which a suspect
disposition occurred was generated. Three hundred thirty-nine
cases were identified. Manual evaluation resulted in the correction
of thirty-six disposition dates. Thirty additional cases were corrected by eliminating the recorded disposition date and recoding
the case as "open." In total, sixty-six disposition dates were
corrected.
In total, 2,014 cases were evaluated by comparing the case print
for each case with the information recorded on the magnetic tape.
The sample of two hundred cases presumed to be "good" had an
error rate of less than 5%. It is therefore concluded that the error
rate for the population (the total population included 2,014
screened cases as well as the cases subject to the sampling procedure) was substantially less than 5%.
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Case Type Evaluation
Since there was an interest in examining the disposition patterns for mediated civil cases across several case types, there was a
two-fold task of determining what this evaluation meant by case
type, and then determining whether that definition conformed to
the case type code used in the court's computer for the population
of cases. A sample of one hundred twenty-nine cases was drawn for
the following case types: contract (12); products liability (6); malpractice (7); general civil (8); personal injury (13); and auto personal
injury (19). A review of the case files for these cases found one case
in the product liability case type that arguably was a premises liability case.5 The malpractice category disclosed five medical and two
legal malpractice claims. The general civil category involved several
premises liability cases, with one case involving an alleged failure to
pay benefits under an automobile insurance contract. The personal
injury case type involved almost exclusively premises liability cases.
One products liability case was also filed as a personal injury case.
All of the cases filed under the auto personal injury case type involved alleged injuries arising from an automobile accident.
Given the size of our data set, the case type sample was somewhat small; a sample size of four hundred to five hundred cases
would have been more desirable. Notwithstanding this problem, it
is felt that, in most cases, the case type designated by the attorney
filing the case was generally relationed to the substance of the dispute. The initial fear that attorneys may have been manipulating
their choice of case type designation for some strategic purpose was
unwarranted.

5. Although a fork lift truck was implicated in the accident, the thrust of the
case involved the alleged negligence of the owner of the premises where the fork
truck was supplied and operated. Premise liability cases would be more appropriately filed in personal injury or other general civil case types.

